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Rome, October 3, 1969

To the Superiors General
To their Delegates for Sedos
To the members of all Sedos groups

Enclosed please find:

1. Social Communications

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2. Development work

    Report on the second meeting of the
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3. Medical work

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Please note the following dates for October:

October 16th: ad hoc group on Catechists
        17th: Executive Committee
        21st: ad hoc group on Education
        23rd: meeting by country: Brazil
        24th: ad hoc group on Formation
        27th: task group Sodepax+Sedos (provisional)


Sincerely yours,

Benjamin Tonna

Benjamin Tonna

Executive Secretary

Conclusions of the special meeting of the SEDOS working group for social communications with Mr. L. McMaster of SODEPAX, Geneva, on October 1st, 1969, at 1o.oo am, at the SEDOS secretariat in Rome.

1. It was agreed that an ecumenic consultation on social communications would be most useful and most desirable. The general theme of such consultation would be: <u>how ought the Churches to be using the mass media</u>? More specifically it would discuss the present and potential <u>uses</u> of the <u>media</u> (press, radio, TV, cinema) by the Christian <u>Churches</u> in their activities of promoting <u>development</u>, justice and peace in society.

2. The consultation would be sponsored by SODEPAX, SEDOS and other bodies and would aim at the participation of about 3o experts and decision makers responsible for social communications in WCC and RCC organizations like WACC, Ravenco, the communicators in the developing countries, and the missionary sending institutes. Organizational staff and funds could be provided by SODEPAX.

3. It was agreed that a task group of about 7 would be immediately formed and that it could meet in Rome during the last week of October, 1969, in order to
   a) specify the details of the consultation (agenda, where, when, how long, how, who),
   b) commission resource persons to prepare surveys of the situation of the uses of the mass media by the Churches (by medium and by region),
   c) determine the main lines for following up the consultation and for utilizing its possible "spin-off's".

4. Mr. McMaster agreed to present the above conclusions to the WACC meeting on October 6th to 11th, 1969, and to report on its reactions to the SEDOS group through the SEDOS secretariat. He would also inquire whether the surveys under 3b above would be possible before the end of 1969.
   Fr. M. Reuver suggested that he might assume responsibility of one or two such surveys.
   Meanwhile, suggestions for participants in the suggested consultation can be forwarded to the SEDOS secretariat.

<div align="right">B. Tonna</div>

Present were: Mr. L. McMaster, Fathers A.C. Mills sj, S. Bamberger sj, F. Eilers svd, S. MacCarthy sma, A. McCormack mhm, Y. Perigny omi, B. Tonna, Sisters M. Caron ws, Isabel rshm, A. Oosschot scmm-m, M. Tully rshm, Miss AM.B. Kohler. In the chair: Fr. M. Reuver ocarm.

SOCIAL COMMUNICATIONS

The following paper by a distinguished British physicist who is Professor
of Communication at the University of Keele, England, was read at the meet-
ing of Societas Ethics at Münster in Germany on 29th August, 1967. It
has been published in German in Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik XII/3,
May 1968.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE MANIPULABILITY OF MAN

The aim of this paper is to consider how the scope and limits of human
manipulability may be affected by developments in a relatively new field
of science. Variously referred to by such terms as communication system
theory, the theory of information-processing, or (confusingly because
of its woolly associations) "cybernetics", this new discipline has grown
out of the needs of communication and control engineers for a precise
way of thinking about systems which depend for their functioning upon
the flow and transformation of information. Telephone networks, computers,
the human brain itself, even the human community are all examples of
"information systems" to which certain generalizations and methods of
analysis can be applied with varying degrees of usefulness.

The new technology growing from these methods is relevant to our present
subject in two ways: first, by equipping the would-be manipulator with
new and powerful tools of communication and control, it is radically
changing our picture of what is possible; and second, by giving us new
ways of looking at social interactions, it reveals the nature of the
manipulative relationship and its limitations in an interesting and I
think a helpful light.

The kind of manipulation in wich I take it we are interested is that which
enables one man to control the decisions of others, without himself being
vulnerable to reciprocal action. The harangue of a demagogue, the blandish-
ments of an advertiser, the proverbial machinations of Big Business, all
typify the relationship in which one agent whose goal is fixed tries to
induce others to adopt compatible or subservient goals, without laying
himself open to any corresponding modification of his own. This absence
of reciprocity is in fact a key feature of the manipulative situation.

It distinguishes it sharply from dialogue, in which each participant may seek to influence the goals of the other, but each is also "transparent" to, and open to influence by, the other, with far-reaching logical consequences, as we shall see.

Manipulability is closely connected with predictability, in that if A is to manipulate B he must be able to predict to some extent how B would be affected by the various actions open to A (including inaction). Note however that to call B's action predictable by A is not necessarily to imply that it is inevitable for B himself. On the contrary, a typical choice may be logically indeterminate for the chooser, even if it were predictable by everyone else (1). If the observer's prediction would be rendered out of date by the chooser's knowing or believing it, then it is not definitive for the chooser, and he would be logically in error to regard the outcome as inevitable for him.

Thus anyone who troubles to observe his neighbour's reading habits may predict successfully, let us say, that he will buy "The Times" on his way to work tomorrow morning; but for his neighbour there is nothing inevitable about the action. Its conditional predictability is quite different in character from the universal predictability of an eclipse for example, which if inevitable for anyone is inevitable for everyone, whether he knows it or not or likes it or not.

2. Manipulation and Responsibility

This clears the way for a further question. To what extent does manipulation of B by A relieve B of responsibility for his action? Could we say for example that "if a man's behaviour results from manipulation performed without his knowledge or consent, then he could not truly be said to have acted by his own free choice"? (2)

I think we must say that in any such case the manipulator shares in responsibility for the action; but we would be unwise to jump to the conclusion that the agent's responsibility is necessarily reduced. Consider a gentle example (3). A philanthropist is moved to send money to Mr. A. by catching a chance glimpse of his ragged children. There is no question here of manipulation. But suppose that Mr. A's neighbour gets to hear of this and decides to "try it on" by sending his children in rags past the philanthropist's window, with a similar result. We would, I think, judge him to be a manipulator, bears some responsibility for the outcome. Yet the philanthropist's decision, reached (we suppose) in the same way as before, would surely be no less "of his own free choice". It is a note-

worthy feature of responsibility that it is not always diminished by being shared.

Responsibility for an action is annulled, I suggest, only if or in so far as the action can be shown to be inevitable by the agent, rather than merely predictable by a manipulator or anyone else. Only if the manipulator's means of control enables him to make a prediction of his unconsenting victim's action which the latter would be correct to believe whether he likes it or not - if for example he has control by means of an electrode deep in his victim's brain - only then can the victim be denied any share of responsibility for the action.

3. New Means of Manipulation

Certain possibilities of manipulation are now well-recognized. The use of drugs, still in an early stage of development, could make possible more subtle control over personality factors than is dreamt of today; but it should be said that this is less likely to be feasible with large groups than with individuals, and at least one authority at the recent symposium on Man and his Future doubted that drugs posed any serious threat to human liberty (4). Conditioning and brainwashing techniques, control of press and radio and the like have been sufficiently canvassed in recent years to need little discussion.

More insidious are two possibilities that I think receive less than their share of attention today. Both arise from the explosive development of computing and information-processing technology. The first is a by-product of the increasing use of computer networks to collect and condense information about a whole group or nation, on an unprecedented scale. Economic pressures are likely to force the pace of such developments, so that before long a would-be manipulator in the right place could have virtually instant access both to the key statistics he needs and to individual particulars, such as medical and family histories, of the most intimate kind. Already computer specialists in this area are voicing their concern. Paul Baran, for example, in a recent research paper entitled "Remarks on the Question of Privacy raised by the Auto-mation of Mental Health Records", describes the prospect of a fully interconnected national computer system with inadequate safeguards as "in some instances, downright dangerous to our present day concepts of a right-to-privacy" (5).

Conversely, a large computer system could be used to distribute the controlling influence of a manipulator over a large number of indi-....

vidually insignificant happenings, so as to achieve a major result. To take a trivial example, someone who wished to embarrass the electricity authorities could (without even using a computer) instruct ten million T.V. listeners to turn on their electric kettles simultaneously, creating an uncontrollable surge on the power lines. (This phenomenon happened by accident in Britain recently, when the close of a favourite T.V. show so synchronised the demand for kettle-boiling power as to trip the overload switches for the whole of S.E. England!) With the help of a large computer system, the power of a single agent to produce and control large-scale events by small, carefully timed and distributed actions could be enormous, and might even be undetectable without the help of similar computer aids.

4. Predictive Manipulation

The second possibility is perhaps even more disturbing, because it has been largely created by society itself. In our insatiable hunger for information about ourselves, we have let loose on the political and social scene a host of potential manipulators to whom every facility is granted for their art in the name of "social science". These are, of course, the investigators of public opinion; and their power stems from the fact that in general the sampling and publication of opinion polls does not merely inform but exerts an influence on the sampled system which could in principle be calculated in advance. By choosing whether or when to publish his results, the pollster can thus wield a degree of power out of all proportion to his recognized function and responsibility (6).

Why, it may be asked, should we raise special objections to this situation, when we have long tolerated manipulation by "selection of facts" on the part of politicians and the political press? The reason of course is that the polister's manipulative role is not recognized as such. Because his data are objective, he is widely believed (and may even believe himself) to have the neutrality of the pure scientist. What is so insidious is that manipulation is here offered in the guise of information. The manipulator is only doing what he is asked to do; the mistake is ours for setting him a logically impossible task. As we have seen, in general no completely detailed "take it or leave it" prediction exists to be discovered, which is equally valid and binding upon the whole community whether they know it or not or like it or not - unless it concerns something already decided (7). When we ask a pollster to predict the outcome of an election, therefore, we expose him to a cruel

dilemma. If he samples carefully enough, he can be fairly confident of his prediction provided it remains secret. With enough information and computing facilities, he can probably determine what effect publication of the prediction would have on voting behaviour, and hence on its own accuracy. If he has evidence that people generally are "bandwagon-minded", he can predict that publication will increase the predicted majority; if they are "underdog-minded", then publication will reduce and might reverse the majority. As Herbert Simon has shown (8), he may even be able to calculate what prediction (or predictions) would become correct if (and only if) published.

5. The Pollster's Dilemma

What then should he do? If he publishes an unadjusted forecast, he knows it will falsify itself to some calculable extent, though it would have been accurate if kept secret. In order to retain the reputation of a scientific prognosticator, his obvious course would be to publish an adjusted forecast-adjusted to allow for the effects of its own publication. But in that case, he is deliberately arranging that the outcome shall be different from what it would have been if he had published only his original observations, and different also from what it would have been if he had refrained from publishing anything. Moreover, as Simon showed (loc. cit.), he may even have a choice of several predictions, any one of which would be self-fulfilling if published.

Notice what has happened. By creating the role of public predictor in an area where no "take it or leave it" public knowledge is possible in advance of public decision, we not only permit but force the predictor, willy nilly, to play a significant part in shaping public decisions on our behalf. The greater the computing power at his disposal and the more efficient his information network, the more clearly the options confronting him are defined and the more precisely his function becomes manipulative rather than informative. And note once again that he cannot shake loose from his manipulative role by choosing to do nothing, since this would simply amount to deciding for the outcome that he knows will follow if he does nothing.

Doubtless there are few public opinion pollsters today with the skill or facilities to wield this power significantly; and in many situations the range of options for the predictive manipulator might in any case be disappointingly small. The power to decide whether a majority shall be 25%, 26% or 27% would not perhaps be thought worth much trouble to

gain; though by the democratic standard of "one man, one vote" it is remarkable enough. But with the present rapid development of computing and information-processing facilities, it seems none too early to ask whether we should be content to leave such disproportionate power in the hands of men with no democratic mandate, and perhaps few suitable qualifications for its exercise.

6. Dialogue

Manipulation requires calculation. A precondition of successful manipulation is that the process of calculation can be kept isolated from the manipulated situation, sufficiently to prevent "feedback" which would render the calculation out of date. In the relationship of dialogue, to the extent that the goals of each partner are reciprocally open to adjustment by the other, feedback of this kind is inevitable, and manipulation correspondingly (9). For the mutual interaction that takes place in dialogue (as distinct from alternate monologue) makes the partners effectively one system for purposes of mechanistic analysis and prediction, so that in respect of certain actions each becomes incalculable and "logically indeterminate" for all the others in dialogue as well as for himself. None of them can logically regard such actions as unconditionally inevitable. This, I have suggested elsewhere (10), is the ethically essential sense in which human beings must be recognized by one another as objectively free. Deterministic theories of behaviour thus offer no excuse from responsibility, since the foregoing argument requires no assumptions to be made as to the existence or non-existence of physical or psychological causes of our actions.

Conversely, a calculator who withdraws from the vulnerability of dialogue may thereby enhance his powers of manipulation by increasing his calculating capacity. He may continue to communicate, but to the extent that his goals are invulnerable he does so purely manipulatively. There is however one interesting condition in which even an isolated manipulator can be indefinitely embarrassed by his victims, namely if they can equip themselves with an equivalent observing and calculating system, so that they are able to see the outcome of his calculations as fast as he does, and so are in a position to upset the basis of any predictions he might otherwise have made (11).

7. Predestination

In much popular theology (and anti-theology) the manipulative relationship

par excellence issupposed to be that of an omnipotent Creator to his
creatures. The distinction between manipulation and predestination may
therefore be worth clarifying in passing. Consider first the case of
the human author of a work of fiction. We must of course agree that he
is "omnipotent" over the whole course of the synthetic history he creates.
Nothing exists, nothing happens in it without his fiat. All, in that
sense, is "predestined" by him. But it would be a confusing misuse of
words to speak of him therefore as manipulating his creatures, just as
it would be to describe him as "more powerful" than they. His power and
theirs are not logically comparable, for his creative action is not one
of the forces operating among others in their world. For him their history
is not a succession of events still in the future, requiring prediction
and manipulation, but a single coherent fact.

In particular, the decisions of his creatures (assuming that he has given
them normal human capacities) are made only by themselves. No prediction
of their choices can be formulated, even by their author, which they
would have been correct to believe as inevitable before the event in
question. They are, in that sense, created free, despite the full sovereignty
of their author over their whole history.

The Christian doctrine of creation is doubtless only faintly illuminated
by our human analogy; but in so far as it entails a belief in divine
sovereignty and predestination it seems equally free of any implication
that God manipulates His creatures (12). On the contrary, the biblical
teaching is precisely that we are created free and responsible: not,
indeed, **free** to make ourselves perfect; but free in choosing between the
possibilities open to us, despite the predestination of our whole history
by its divine Author. Even God Himself could formulate no "take it or
leave it" production of our choice, including the process leading up to
it, which we would be correct to believe as inevitable before we chose;
for a situation in which all outcomes but one are known or believed before-
hand by the agent to be impossible is a situation in which the agent
cannot choose in the normal sense. Indeed, if the choosing process would
be significantly affected in any detail by the acceptance of a prediction
of it by the chooser, to that extent the prediction cannot be uncondi-
tionally binding upon him.

The crucial difference between human and divine authorship, however,
comes in connection with the question of responsibility. No author, human
or divine, can be held responsible for the choices of his creatures,
except in a Pickwickian sense. Shakespeare does not share in responsibility
for Iago's misdeeds, nor can God be held responsible for ours. On the

other hand, whereas Iago was in no sense responsible for his actions
to Shakespeare, Christian theism affirms that we are responsible to our
creator for ours. Does this not involve a contradiction?

Here we come back to the logical peculiarities attending the relationship
of dialogue. If, as biblical theism maintains, our Author has "written
Himself a part" in the history He has created so as to enter into dialogue
with us, then within that realtionship even God himself must know us as
free beings, impossible of complete manipulation as long as dialogue
continues, with whom interaction must include the inter-personal forms
of pleading, reproof, exhortation, forgiveness and the like. The predictive
knowledge of a manipulator, or even the timeless knowledge of an author,
is not fully available within that relationship even for Him, because
of the self-cancellation that would be entailed in dialogue. So there
is no contradiction; the appearance of it arises only if we confuse what
can be said of God-in-eternity, our Author, with what can be said of
God-in-time, who meets us and holds us answerable to Him.

8. When is Manipulation Unethical?

We have so far tended to speak of manipulation as something ethically
unsatisfactory; and indeed it usually is. There are, however, certain
common situations where this is not the case. In clinical psychiatry,
for example, we encourage the patient to give himself up to be manipulated
for his own good; and all of us at an early enough age endured purely
manipulative relationships for which we are now grateful.

Perhaps the most difficult borderline case, and one which creates much
confusion today, is that of the education and upbringing of children.
Until recently it was taken for granted that parents had not only a
right but a duty to mould the value-system and character of their children
in accordance with the best they knew. In these enlightened days, however,
there are many who condemn all this kind of teaching as "manipulation"
or "indoctrination". The ethics of the alternatives they offer are not
always beyond question, but that is not here our concern. What needs to
be asked first is whether, and when, manipulation is unethical in this
context.

This is of course a big question which could take us far beyond our present
topic; but one possible suggestion emerges from our earlier discussion.
The basic objection to the manipulator is that he dehumanizes, by treating
people as objects. We have seen that where a certain kind of reciprocal
coupling exists between two individuals, they necessarily cease to be

fully specifiable to one another. In that sense it becomes impossible
for either to treat or even conceive of the other as a mere object, fully
specifiable to him in principle.

Now it is clear that not all manipulation requires the withdrawal from
this interpersonal relationship to be complete; what is needed is only
sufficient "uncoupling" to provide predictive information in the area
of the manipulation. Only that area, and not necessarily the whole indi-
vidual, is and must be "dehumanized" for this purpose. It would therefore
seem that to define manipulation (in the technical sense) as ipso facto
unethical is to fasten dangerously upon the wrong thing. What is ethically
significant, and may be either good or bad, is rather the kind of relation-
ship necessitated by the manipulation. It is in part the lack of reciprocal
openness, the rejection of all answerability in the manipulator we were
discussing earlier, that makes his attitude and practice unethical.

But, it may be said, is not the trouble with the old-fashioned parent
or teacher just that his teaching is not open to question, and that he
declines to be held to account by the child he instructs? This may be
true enough - at the time. It is equally true of the clinician that he
declines to give all the judgements of his patient equal weight with his
own. Each rejects questioning for what he regards as good reasons, of
immaturity or mental disorder in his charges. To his extent fully symmetri-
cal dialogue is in fact impossible for the time being. It would be a
naive mistake, however, to conclude from this that these admitted manipula-
tors have rejected all answerability in principle. As far as the best of
them are concerned, nothing would give more pleasure than to be confronted
in due course by their charges, mature and of sound mind, and to answer
for their manipulative actions in full dialogue. Only, in the nature of
the case, this pleasure has to be deferred for a time. They believe that
they best betoken their future answerability by exercising the highest
skill now, in the most single-minded way, to the purpose that they will
in due course be glad to defend if asked.

9. Potential Answerability

It is the nature and degree of potential answerability in this sense,
rather than the degree of manipulation being exercised, that I suggest
we should concentrate upon for ethical purposes. If we want to make it
more concrete, we can envisage an imaginary advocatus infantis confronting
the educator here and now on behalf of the child, and demanding all the
explanations to which the child as an adult will one day be entitled.
It is by the educator's attitude to such an advocatus that the ethics
of his manipulations would stand to be judged.

Of course in proportion as children are capable of dialogue, the educator
has a measure of answerability to them from their earliest communicative
years. More and more forms of manipulation that were initially legitimate
become degrading and unethical as the child grows up, because they would
involve the refusal of a level of dialogue for which he has gradually
acquired the necessary equipment. What I am trying to emphasize is not
(heaven forbid!) that any technique of instruction is legitimate with
children provided that we would be prepared to defend its purpose, but
rather the converse: that a technique cannot be ethically evaluated solely
by asking whether it is manipulative. We must indeed ask whether any
manipulation is being used as a substitute for a level of dialogue to
which the child's maturity entitles him; but if so it is the refusal of
due dialogue rather than the presence of manipulation as such that invites
our condemnation.

This last consideration rules out the appeal of the benevolent dictator,
who might also claim that in due course he will be prepared to defend
his manipulations, so that he is "potentially answerable". This would
be a mistaken interpretation of the term. A dictator, whether benevolent
or not, is someone who does not at the moment want to be answerable to
anyone. His methods are objectionable, not simply because they involve
manipulation, but because they do so as a substitute for dialogue with
people who (unlike children or mental patients) are fully capable of
and entitled to it now. The category of potential answerability applies
only if actual answerability is impossible for good reason.

10. To What End?

Some men are born manipulators, some acquire the taste, and some have
manipulative functions thrust upon them. Symposia such as Man and His
Future provide ample illustrations of the temptations that our mushrooming
technology offers to all three classes. One of our main themes has been
that developments in computing and information-processing aids have created
a whole new category of people whose knowledge may make them manipulators
whether they like it or not, since they can choose when and whether to
share their information, and can know in advance the different consequences
of doing so at any time. In this respect social scientists are in much
the same position as their colleagues in natural science; the chief
difference lies in the kind of power that they wield and the extent to
which it is recognized. What we do with a physical or biological discovery
is, at least in democratic theory, subject to normative decision by the
community. But when a man makes the normative process itself his subject

of investigation, he acquires a power which can in principle elude control by that process—as long as no limits are set to his freedom of investigation.

In any case, there can be no doubt that the future will see the technical resources for the manipulation of society increase, perhaps dramatically. It urges upon us a question which must remain unanswerable within science itself (13): If manipulation of society one way or another becomes increasingly unavoidable, by whom and to what ends should it be exercised, and by what canons should it be judged?

<div align="right">Donald M. MacKay</div>

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(1) MacKay, D.M. "On the Logical Indeterminacy of a Free Choice", Mind, 69, pp. 31-40, 1960. See also: Nachrichtentechnische Zeitschrift, Jahrgang 16, Heft 12, 1963. Brain and Conscious Experience, pp. 422-445 (J.C. Eccles, ed.), Springer-Verlag, New York, 1966; and Popper (ref. 11).

(2) Flew, A.G.N. in Brain and Mind (J.R. Smythies, ed.), p.120 Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965; but see also p. 134.

(3) MacKay, D.M. (in discussion) Idem, pp. 129-131.

(4) Hoagland, H. "Potentialities in the Control of Behaviour" in Man and his Future (G. Wolstenholme, ed.); pp. 299-314, Churchill, 1963.

(5) Baran, P. "Remarks on the Question of Privacy Raised by the Automation of Mental Health Records", RAND Memo. No. P-3523, April 1967.

(6) MacKay, D.M. "Machines and Societies" in Man and his Future (G. Wolstenholme, ed.), pp. 153-167, Churchill, 1963.

(7) MacKay, D.M. "Information and Prediction in Human Sciences" in Information and Prediction in Science (S. Dockx and P. Bernays, eds.) (Symposium of Int. Acad. for Phil. of Science, 1962), pp. 255-269, Academic Press, New York, 1965.

(8) Simon, H.A. "Bandwagon and Underdog Effects and the Possibility of Election Predictions", Public Opinion Quarterly, pp. 245-253, 1954.

(9) MacKay, D.M. "Communication and Meaning - a Functional Approach" in Cross-Cultural Understanding: Epistemology in Anthropology (F. S. C. Northrop and Helen Livingston, eds.), Harper and Row, pp. 162-179, 1964.

(10) MacKay, D.M. Freedom of Action in a Mechanistic Universe (21st Eddington Memorial Lecture), Cambridge University Press, 1967.

(11) MacKay, D.A. loc. cit. ref. 6, p. 165. For a detailed discussion of the limitations of coupled computers see Popper, K. R. "Indeterminism in Quantum Physics and in Classical Physics". The British Journal for Philosophy of Science, Part 1, pp. 117-133, Part II, pp. 173-195, 1950.

(12) MacKay, D.M. " The Sovereignty of God in the Natural World". Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 21, No. 1, March 1968, pp. 13-26.

(13) Vickers, G. The Art of Judgement - A Study of Policy Making, Chapman and Hall, 1965. Towards a Sociology of Management, Basic Books, Inc., 1967.

FAO - Continuity Committee

A meeting of the Continuity Committee of the RC-ZWFC group was held at
the FAO on September 24 at 09.00. Present were: Mr. C. Weitz, Mr. D.
Tweddle, Fathers O. Rink, B. Tonna, Misses M. Groothuizen, M. A. Besson,
D. Prior-Palmer and Mr. P.G. Coleman. In the Chair: Mr. C. Weitz.

1) <u>Participants</u>. The II World Food Congress would be a people's confe-
   rence rather than an experts' meeting. The case of the people would
   be presented by their local leaders. Among the latter would be the
   missionaries. In a way these leaders would act as a bridge between
   the people and the "tecnichians".

   As the invitations would not be sent out before February 1970 there
   was still time for new proposals by the Committee, besides the nine
   persons already submitted by Sedos. In principle, the Committee would
   aim for local people and for a long, rather than short list of possi-
   ble participants. It would be wise to suggest to the local Freedom
   from Hunger Committees and the local non government organizations
   to send in long lists. It would also help if the same people appeared
   on several lists (including the Government list).

2) <u>Literature</u>. Besides the blue pamphlet, the FAO - would be preparing
   study guides and, in January, a popular version of the Indicative
   World Plan. In its next bulletin, the organizing committee would
   also offer a bibliography on the issues raised by the Congress. The
   Congress documents would appear in booklet form and would consist of
   about 5000 words each. They should reach the participants hands by the
   end of February 1970.

3) As further background material, Mr. Weitz proposed a study by Roman
   Catholic thinkers and theologians of the FAO's Indicative World Plan
   as an answer to the RC Church's appeals for development. The out-come
   could produce a policy discussion guide, which the Congress could put
   to the rest.

4) The proposal raised the issue of the motivation required to activate
   the IWP. The contribution of the Catholic organizations could here
   be crucial. At the international level, they could study the ways
   and means of advocating their policies as well as the most effective
   approach to the mobilization of resources in terms of such policies.

Our world often seems to fall apart because it fails to find a common objective, Mr. Tweddle remarked.

5) A related issue was that of building **up** an information system to ensure feedback from the local populations. It is not just a question of persuading the FAO to work with the grass root missionaries (and, vice-versa, the grass root missionary to work with the FAO) but also one of convincing the world that development is too serious to be left only in the hands of Government. One practical objective could be that of tackling it in teams: each team could thus include a FAO expert and a missionary – and, as an "expert in humanity" the latter's task would be that of making the FAO's efforts meaningful to the local people.

<div align="right">B. Tonna</div>

MEDICAL WORK

A meeting of the Contact Group for Medical Work was held on September
11, 1969 at 4 p.m. at the Sedos Secretariat. Present were: Mother
Duarte Fmm, Sister Jacquelin and Fr. B. Tonna. In the chair: Sr. A.M.
de Vreede scmm-m.

1 Sr. A.M. de Vreede reported on progress made in 1969. The Group had
met five times and had been successful in interesting Generalates in
the common problems of medical work in the mission. Most Superiors
General seamed convinced of the need for a shift in medical policy:
from hospital centred to community geared medical work. Comprehensive
health care had been accepted as the specific objective of medical
missionaries. The problem now seemed to be that of finding out ways
and means of achieving it.

2 It was agreed to call a full meeting of Superiors General and Assistants
to study this last topic. The day would preferably be November 27,
and the place the Ursuline Generalate. Dr. Hellberg of the CMC, Geneva,
would be asked to prepare an orientation paper. The meeting would then
study the situations in Eastern Africa and other areas in an effort
to hammer out concrete proposals for cooperative action. Sr. A.M. de
Vreede would invite Dr. Hellberg while Fr. B. Tonna would book the
Ursuline Generalate and prepare the meeting. The announcement would
be made in mid-October.

3 It was agreed to send a reminder to those Generalates which had not
answered the June questionnaire on the deployment of their medical
personnel. It was essential for the contact Group to know in which
countries the Institutes of these Generalates were working.

4 Sister A.M. de Vreede then reported on the CMC meeting, held at Zurich
on August 25 to 29, 1969 (see report on the meeting of the Executive
Committee of September 10, 1969, Bulletin 28, pages 69/718-720).

5 The Group agreed to meet again during the first week of November, 1969.

B. Tonna