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Chu
S.P. Okongwu, KBE PhD (Harvard) "Now we command you, brethren, in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, that you keep away from any brother who is living in idleness and not in accord with the tradition that you received from us. For you yourselves know how you ought to imitate us; we were not idle when we were with you. We did not eat any one’s bread without paying, but with toil and labour, we worked night and day, that we might not burden any of you. It was not because we have not the right, but to give you in our conduct an example to imitate" (2 Thes 3:6-9). ... we see only possibilities of action. And let us add at once, to anticipate an objection which automatically arises: these possibilities of action do not constitute any sort of connected system, they do not represent in each region an inseparable whole: if they are capable of being seized they cannot all be seized by men at the same time with the same force ... all possibilities are not compossibilities (Lucien Febvre, A Geographical Introduction to History, p. 174). 1 Introductory Remarks Fifty years ago, on the justifiable basis of a sad incident with apparently disastrous consequences, a boy resolved to separate from the Church in any of its denominations. The lad was then in his second year at secondary school. His father, who had rendered some 28 years of illustrious service to the CMS establishment as a renowned schoolmaster, had died that Easter. Despite appeals from the Principal, the CMS authorities refused to assume the burden of the boy’s school fees, even as a minimal gesture of appreciation for the father’s long years of meritorious service. From the boy’s perspective, catastrophe seemed certain. The good principal, finally, kindly remitted the fees to permit the boy to continue his education. That boy, now an old man, today stands before you, eminent theologians, as an honoured guest, invited to concelebrate with you and to deliver the 1998 MA Convocation lecture is surely testimony to the greatness of God, his amazing grace and wondrous ways. Viewed now with the luxury of retrospection, that incident was of course only one of many disturbances in life’s various and complex enjambments. Disturbances, as we shall see, are necessary ingredients of self-development. The proviso is that they be neither two large nor too frequent. Our topic is at once noble, urgent and complex — as complex as Africa itself; and noble and urgent as regards its valid concern for an enduring resolution of Africa’s worsening predicament. Given the complexity of the issues and the time constraint, I think that we can secure much analytical mileage if we mimic the method artists often employ: sketch the outline(s), albeit with crude brush strokes and later attend to the details and distinctnesses, extensions and amendments — especially during the discussion period and, more importantly, in our minds after today, if possible months or years on — when you are in the field — after tomorrow’s graduation formalities. Accordingly, this paper offers no more than Discussion Notes. 2. Definitions and Limitations That we shall speak of Africa in no way implies that we are unmindful of its complexities. Africa for us is simply the continent as represented by today’s map-makers: that essential triangle, bounded on its northern flat by the Mediterranean and the Red Seas, and on its two other sides by the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, together with its outlying islands. Just as with any other continent, it is subject to its own historical-geographical tensions, has its own internal networkings and external linkages with other continents (especially, Europe, Asia and the New World) — true with different traffic vectors, rhythms and mediators at different periods throughout history. The seas and even the Sahara desert were, as every schoolboy knows, arterial highways in this networking. Note at once the heteroclite traffic vector, with differing geographies of derivation, but with New World terminus, sustained for over four centuries, which, composed with flows from Europe and Asia, facilitated the construction of the New World. As to the 21st century, note that in reality, the universe has no centuries. Centuries start and end every day. What we now generally employ is the Gregorian convenience; and even at that there is some amusing debate as to whether the 21st century will start on 1 January, 2000 or 1 January, 2001. (See Asa Briggs and David Snowman (eds.), Fins de Siècle, How Centuries End 1400-2000, Yale, l996, pp. l97-230, and the references cited therein). At any rate, the simple point I wish to stress is two-fold: (1) From the viewpoint of global historical structure, the 21st century is already here, with a new era in world history which began about 1988-1994. We do not know when it will end but by all indications a new era is upon us. According to Eric Hobsbawn, "... there can be no serious doubt that in the late 1980s and early l990s an era in world history ended and a new one began" (Eric Hobsbawn, Age of Extremes, Joseph, 1994, p. 5). (2) Those who are waiting for the year 2000 or 2001 will find themselves left behind by the global train. Accordingly, I shall confine attention to what I call the Early Current 21st Century, that is the period 1988/1994 - 2038/2044 or thereabout. Kondratieff enthusiasts may take it as corresponding roughly to a fifth Kondratieff cycle lasting till about 2038/2044 with a 50-year span, although we must always bear in mind Schumpeter’s caution against the dangers of such predictions. We shall use the terms change, disturbance, challenge or shock interchangeably. For our purposes here, they are equivalent. 3. Some Dimensions of the African Predicament Taking into account the pitfalls of statistical aggregates and projections therefrom, let us suppose that there obtains somehow in our period a magical situation whereby Africa enjoys a phenomenal growth rate of some 8 per cent per annum in per capita real GNP, while the rest of the world, especially the set of industrial centres, stands still. From a base of some $US470 (1988) that would just about place sub-Saharan Africa after 50 years at a point ($US22,044) in a neighbourhood where North America was in 1988 ($US 19,850). This supplies a crude measure of the African predicament and the indicated effort in the global context. We may of course seek to improve the (information content of the) metric by adjoining to the foregoing a set of other quantities relating to food production, energy, access to education and health, employment, trade balance, housing, "consumption" of radio and television, human development and distress, depending on taste (see, example, UNDP, Human Development Report, OUP, for 1991 and other years). However, it is clear that the rest of the world cannot and will not stand still. And we may legitimately query the information content of such a construct. What precisely do we mean when we compare the USA and United Arab Emirates (same per capita GDP), Qatar and Cuba, Saudi Arabia and China, or Nigeria and India? Cross-sectional analysis offers important insights. But deprived of its basis and envelope of history, it is of limited utility; for our purposes, it is probably worse than useless. I believe that history is a more illuminating aid for capturing the key factors entailed in an enduring resolution of Africa’s predicament. Consider the following sketch, which flows from our previous observation on the African triangle. Once, from the age of sail, at the beginning of the early modern period, the Atlantic was the "Highway of the World". Given knowledge of the global wind system, and favourably located, Western Europe grasped the presented opportunities and travelled this highway to world hegemony (Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, Millennium, Bantam, 1995, Fernard Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th - 18th Century, UCB and Harper, 3 vols, especially vol. 2, pp. 402 - 415). Five hundred years on, in the age of the microchip, the centre of gravity of global initiative (simply defined as the capacity to manage present and prospective change in terms of the important co-ordinates of enterprise, production and finance) is shifting towards Asia and the Pacific rim. This process has recently suffered a shock/setback but will undoubtedly recover and accelerate. But will it endure? Or, equivalently, after Asia, where next and when the shift, since nothing except change is permanent in human history — and herein has Francis Fukuyama’s erred — for as long as there is humanity historical change will continue and there will be history. Africa, which also abuts the Atlantic highway, was essentially sidelined in the shift of the early modern period, suffering conquest, depredation and partition in result. Why? Certainly, the relative interior isolation of her "shy and retiring" empires (Mali, Songhay, Ghana, Mwene Mutapa), defective structures of existing states (Morocco, Egypt), absence of viable state structures in the coastal areas (Ashanti, Dahomey, Benin, Kongo), technological backwardness when mastery of the wind system and possession of the gun were decisive, were contributory factors. Africa was thus unable to authentically participate in and profit from the ensuing unprecedented growth in world production and distribution of resources (so-called First Industrial Revolution and its aftermath). In the current shift of initiative from the Atlantic to the Pacific — when Atlantic-side location and global wind system mastery have been displaced by control of the microchip in the advantage set — Africa is again being sidelined. It is plagued by political-social instability, infra-national and international tensions leading in the extreme to warfare, "foreign policy" adventures and famine, economic backwardness, excessive external debt burden, essentially failed state frameworks and infrastructure, rapid institutional decay — especially as regards the important co-ordinates of informal laws and tradition but also of formal laws — among other challenges. We may say that, structurally, in terms of the construction of socio-economic progress, Africa is, once again, headed in the wrong direction. Our problem then is equivalently: How can such structural misdirection be reversed so that Africa participates in shaping and profiting from global economic progress? Or, which is the same, to better manage and possibly influence change. 4. Sources of Global Challenge The helmsman (no gender bias is implied in this term) and system management — indeed, all sensible entrepreneurs in the system (political, social, economic, and intellectual) — should comprehend and well prepare to meet global shocks. Elsewhere, I have discussed in detail world system dynamics and sources of emerging global challenge (Chu Okongwu, The Nigeria National Reconstruction Project, 1992). Here I will update that discussion. The interested reader can modify the suggestive list. From a global perspective some key sources of challenge are as follows: 4.1 Instability of the political situation of the global inter-state system, following from collapse of the Soviet Union. 4.2 Instability in the internal political situation of the world states and their institutions, following from infra-national tensions/forces, loss of power to supranational entities (UN, IBRD, IMF, EU, Coalitions, etc.), and "institutional decay". The theory and practice of the state and the size of the state are no longer received or settled matters. Felipe Fernandez-Armesto considers that big states will continue to fragment (Millennium, pp. 702-707). Note that the role and scope of supranational authorities are in flux. 4.3 Crisis of Liberal Democracy or the Democratic Predicament. For while there is clearly a need for democratic legitimacy of public authorities yet problems abound: decline of organised mass parties; depoliticization or alienation of the citizenry from the political process and relegation of state affairs to the so-called "political class"; public opinion is generally no guide to many decisions of public authorities (e.g. taxes, scientific and technical matters), given "rational ignorance" and "pervasive localism" in the polity; public opinion, as monitored by the polls, and magnified by the increasingly powerful and omnipresent media, often constitutes a siege on public decision-making; and political consensus had been generally undermined. The main issue, however, is to govern effectively and well. Moreover, democracy is like soup with an infinitude of variety according to taste, place and time. Besides, it is always easy to contrive a veneer or gloss of democracy. 4.4 Increased globalisation of the world economy entailing at least: (a) Increased polycentrism or pluralism of economic production, and relative shift towards Asia (China, Japan, NICs), and relative decline of "Eurocentricity"; (b) associated with and reinforcing (a), increased pluralism of global financial centres as well as ever increasing volumes, velocity and variegated menus of the financial flows — promoting trans-nationality of shock transmission, regardless of state boundary or ideology; (c) probable rise of protectionism in the ensuing intensified competition for market and resources; (d) increased gap between rich and poor countries. 4.5 Increased pace of technology change. Awesome challenges are issuing from rapid progress in (i) microelectronics, (ii) computers, (iii) optoelectronics, (iv) advanced manufacturing technologies, (v) biotechnology, and (vi) advanced raw materials technology. 4.6 Closely associated with this, the emergence of information as a key resource for transformation in a rapidly shrinking knowledge-based world. This should have profound impact not only on the demand for industrial raw materials and competitive efficiency, but also on forms of enterprise organisation, some levels and forms of education, and even the future patterns of cities (agglomerations of activities). 4.7 Demographic pressure. While world population will grow, it is expected to stabilise around 10 billion by 2030. In the mean time, while the population structure of the advanced countries will experience relative "ageing", the poorer countries, especially in Africa, will experience relative "youthfulness". How do we propose to cater for an essentially youthful population of some 300-400 million? 4.8 Urbanisation. Similarly, even if we accept that "cities will eventually wither away" (Millennium, pp. 707-708) in the meantime the global structure of urbanisation will change and urban pressures will intensify for us. The population of Lagos has been projected to exceed 20 million! Which management will administer such a city and what infrastructure will service its mega-populace? 4.9 The probable emergence of South Africa, or at any rate Southern Africa, as a political-economic force on the continent. 4.10 The conjugation of the facts of (i) glob-alisation of activities, (ii) shrinking of the globe ("global villaging"), (iii) the "simultaneous coexistence of all history", and (iv) the rapid pace of changes in (i). This poses severe shocks for all societies; but it is particularly destabilising for backward countries with fragile institutions. "Perhaps the most striking characteristic at the end of the 20th century is the tension between this accelerating process of globalization and the inability of both public institutions and the collective behaviour of human beings to come to terms with it" (Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes, p. l5). 4.11 The bio environment: ecology. Whether from pollution by the industrial centres, imprudent use of resources, pressure of population and urbanisation, the ecological crisis will probably develop. 4.12 It is worth calling separate attention to one source of global pressure alluded to above: namely, that concerted by developed countries and likely to intensify on developing countries. The concert may be exhibited in different supranational fora (UN Security Council, World Bank, GATT/WTO) or by regional blocks (EU) or single powers. The pressures may take different forms: litanies of perceived democracy, human rights, secular theology of the beneficence of the unrestricted free market, or conditionally specifics, e.g. prescriptions of democracy, environmental indices, and "ideal" public expenditure composition linked with aid and debt resolution; high co-efficient of refusal to trade and exchange especially as regards "strategic" goods and services however defined (e.g. assertion of ‘intellectual property rights’ and "industrial watch lists"); expropriation of foreign assets (note in this regard that it is common but erroneous to presume that assets expropriation is the monopoly of developing countries); interdictions of trade (so-called sanctions, quarantine); impeded access to markets including global financial and intellectual resources; instigation and material support of one country against another; naked interference in the internal affairs of a developing country (e.g., support of fissiparous infra-national forces), with the extreme of force projection and supplanting of a genuine national government on grounds of any probable cause. (Note in this last regard that internal coryphaei and cohorts would not be wanting particularly under conditions of social instability or pervasive social injustice). 4.13 So-called "Global War". Humanity of course has not abolished warfare; it is possible that with the development and use of nuclear weapons its "nature" and "dimensions" may have changed. We have also noted that Africa is plagued by internal wars. But it may be asked: which African country or group(s) of countries can credibly deter or successfully meet/fight continental invasion and reconquest, or protect its citizens from the perils of biological-chemical warfare? 4.14 Of special interest to Africa should be the following: (i) External Debt Overhang. Africa’s external debt stock now stands at some $US320 billion (1996) with a debt-service burden of some 25% of exports. My own thinking is that while the debt problem will eventually "die by semantics", this facility will be available to only (a) pure "basket cases"/non-viable countries, and (b) (potentially) viable countries that seriously organise themselves and engage in the requisite dialogue. Otherwise it will be an instrument for pressure (see above). (ii) Minimalist State Philosophy and the predatory/vampire state: Since the theory and practice of the state are under review given the secular ascendancy of minimalist state philosophies (neo-liberalism, conservatism, Thatcherism/ Reaganism), there is the danger that Africa’s failed state structures, instead of courageously reconstructing themselves, may well take refuge in such philosophies and intensify their predatory states. Consider that the industrial centres now confront the issues of how to meet social assurance (old age pensions, employment, and unemployment benefits, medical care, etc.) and public services. (iii) Externalisation and Privatisation of (National) Assets: Similarly, minimalist philosophies may drive the state to externalise national assets under the guise of privatisation and globalisation economics — thus creating problems for the future. (iv) Weak state structures would be particularly prone to undermining by several factors: e.g. (a) global shock transmissions, (b) intense array of NGO activities, (c) trusteeship status demands (voluntary and involuntary) on the part of their citizens (slavery phenomenon) etc. (v) Nations and Nationalism/ Colonial Boundaries: Although artificial boundaries are not unique to Africa, the high incidence, pervasive fragility of state structures and economies, "decolonization" process and decades of bad governance promote infra-national tensions. 5. World System Dynamics Elements of global challenge or disturbance should not be seen as cause for despair. They are to be expected in system development. For the world system — roughly the global super-system with its network of state systems, national economies, division of labour, production, trade and payments, strategic interests, hierarchies of issues and of agents and the evolution of their power distribution over time, competition, and coalitions — is a self-developing system whose process continuously presents new opportunities for action while deleting or modifying old ones. This continuous process of presentation and deletion or modification of opportunities may simply be described as a shock process. No society, not even the most advanced, is immune to such shocks. Authentic survival and progress in the world system requires correct perception and exploitation of the opportunities presented — that is, successful adaptation to shocks. Indeed, such shocks provide the very ingredients of self-development, as I noted in the introductory remarks. Some of these (emerging and probable future) shocks may represent/derive from envisaged profitable opportunities for economic activity, scientific-technological advancement, territorial expansion, or military aggrandisement. The fact of global competition will spur this effort of prospection and solution of problems. From the economic-technical point of view, the most significant shocks presented continuously are those arising from scientific-technological progress, and, therefore, because of the entailed transformation, from the march of industrialisation. The penalty for failure to anticipate or discern global challenges correctly and implement the requisite counter-measures is relative regression. If a system persists in this failure over a long period then the penalty is not only absolute regress but, in terms of the analytic dichotomy between centres and periphery, for it to be structured towards the periphery of the global super-system. There, its form of dependency would be a matter of the prevailing political convention: colony, neo-colony, or trust territory. 6. Internal Weaknesses and Permanent Factors Clearly, shocks may also be internally generated, and in severe form may represent internal weaknesses — e.g., persistent high inflation, and other domestically induced imbalances; overhang of the public sector; atrophy of socio-economic infrastructure; large and growing informal sector; long-term policy instability; formal laws and erosion of traditional values, social tensions leading in the extreme to societal disorderliness, a hyperpraetorian state in which not only "every social force is a political force" but community is in disarray (S.P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale, 1968), or to national disintegration, etc. Furthermore, since no system can ignore or violate its permanent attributes, account must also be taken of these in the transfer process. These may be historically derived (e.g., colonial heritage), geographical (e.g., location, trade structure and mode), or even expectative (e.g., for Africa, expectations of blacks in the Diaspora, or internal expectations). 7. "World Orders, Old and New", Whose? From our approach, every viable state system would need to form a worldview — an expectation of its place and role in the global system in relation to its perceived self-interests and strategies for the promotion of such interests — as a crucial element in the transfer process. Such a vision is an ordering of the world in some sense. But it is clear that a state system may have to take global structure, institutions, and mechanisms as given, unable to influence or change them. Abstractly, however, the expression world order is usually restricted to the worldview of the hegemonic state or coalition of states, specifications (usually gilded) of global power distribution, and of institutions, mechanisms and enforcement, as a means of maintaining such hegemony. Note that the "world order" need not be "systematised" or "formalised", interpretation or application depends on the hegemonic state(s). But this has always been the case. "As for the new world order, it is very much like the old, in a new guise. There are important developments, notably the increasing internationalisation of the economy with its consequences ... and the extension of this system to the former Soviet domains. But there are no fundamental changes, and no ‘new paradigms’ are needed to make sense of what is happening. The basic rules of world order remain as they have always been: the rule of law for the weak, the rule of force for the strong; the principles of ‘economic rationality’ for the weak, state power and intervention for the strong" (Noam Chomsky, World Orders, Old and New, London: Pluto l994, p. 271). Interestingly, although world orders have existed as long as world hegemony, Chomsky considers that it was after the South Commission’s formal call for a "new world order" based on "justice, equity and democracy" (Noam Chomsky, The Challenge to the South, Report of the South Commission, Oxford 1990, p. 287) that US President George Bush "appropriated the phrase for his war in the Gulf". Reflecting the fact of power relations, "It is George Bush’s call for a ‘new world order’ that resounded, not the plaintive plea of the South, unreported and unheard" (Chomsky, The Challenge, p. 7). What I wish to stress is that in the beginning of the early current 21st century: (a) the reality of power remains unarguable; (b) much fog, and thus uncertainty, predominates in the global system; and (c) at all events, from our viewpoint, the impediments (and advantage set) of any world order represent challenges which state system management must confront, hopefully, sagaciously. Four posers: (i) What is the internationally accepted status of Jerusalem (East or Greater)? Who signed such accord? (ii) Considering the recent financial shocks in East Asia, the possibility of transmission elsewhere, and, in any case, the desirability of shock regulation, which international agency supervises global financial markets? The IMF? Where is its mandate? (iii) Is the UN Security Council "balanced" or "democratic"? How may it be so rendered? (iv) What is the "international community" we hear so much about these days? The US, the EU or what? 8. Prospects What are the prospects? Both optimism and the realities oblige me to say that the prospects are NOT hopeless but daunting, in view of the entailed tasks, as should be obvious from the foregoing sections. The tasks revolve around the notion/concept of reconstitution or reconstruction: of individual Africa’s economics to get and keep the individual systems right/efficient, and the formation/construction of larger political-economic spaces. Let me (try to) sketch the essential issues. 9. Getting African Economies Right Africa’s economies have been long overdue for overhaul. Their decline and management inefficiencies can no longer be blamed on colonialism, neo-colonialism, and adverse terms of trade for agricultural or industrial raw materials, monoculture or monoproduct base, and such. For instance, if you are in business and it is not yielding satisfactory returns then you should review your entire system for improved performance or, perhaps, it is time to try another line of business. The internal reorganisation endeavour should include the following: · Forge strong national unity with social justice to ensure national cohesion, so that society acts as one with the advantage of ethno-cultural diversity. · With regard to the economy, pursue policies and programmes which focus more on wealth creation rather than redistribution, via market orientation, simplified procedures (laws and regulations), decentralisation and deconcentration. Resolutely pursue the elimination of the distortions in the various markets so that the economy can find its true internal laws of self-development and create and attract requisite resources for driving it to its set target. Abolish the instrumentality of economic rents. Resolutely promote valid risk taking and competition, and thus productive endeavours as against rent seeking. Promote the stake of each individual in society via ownership of assets and (equality of) access to infrastructure and opportunities for self-development. Improve the mass mobilisation and work ethic of citizens to secure gains in productivity, savings and production. · Resolutely and intelligently legitimate the informal sector to enable it join the economic mainstream. · Insist on simplification of administrative pro-cesses, of laws and regulations; certainty, ease and sanctity of titles and property rights; and the institution of adjudication of contracts. So that the broad mass of the citizenry fully comprehend laws, regulations, procedures and their rights, have a stake in society and answer the call to production. · Pay correct attention to the urgent task of re-habilitating the national equipment (roads, railroads, waterways, and public utilities). These will need continuous maximal maintenance and extension to help open up the economy and reduce transaction costs. · Pay correct attention to the urgent task of maintenance of law and order so that economic agents can go about their legitimate business activity and produce the necessary increased output and productivity gains. · Insist that each level of government faithfully carry out its responsibilities as an aspect of both decentralisation and social responsibility. · Embark on quality education with emphasis on scientific technological education and accent on excellence. · In a nutshell: firmly abolish the instrumentality of economic rents, encourage productive endeavours and the spirit of learning, as well as competition, with an accent on excellence. These tasks can be decomposed into sub-tasks for system agents — especially the helmsman and system managers — with rewarding insights. But we shall not go into such details. 10.Formation of Larger Political-Economic Spaces Wiser heads than mine, especially political scientists/philosophers, will no doubt be able to better inform you here. But I should at least point to some key concerns. The African political-economic landscape is littered with many unviable state structures — with narrow bases and null presence or doubtful future viability, thus repeating, as we have seen, one crucial structural error of the past. No doubt there is the basis of colonial heritage. But some three decades have passed since independence. Combined with the prevalence of bad governance on the continent, the state has become a danger to itself, its citizens and other states — a factor of regress. The proliferation of weak state structures cannot enjoy the gains/externalities associated with strong states in the advancement of the interests of their citizens in domestic or external affairs (e.g. WTO, UN-based, IMF, or IBRD negotiations). Notwithstanding (a) that the theory and practice of the state are under siege, (b) the prevalence of infra-national tensions, (c) the forecast that big states will continue to fragment, given the present state of knowledge, the "state" and the "nation-state" remain vital instruments for regulating human affairs. Africans would need to forge larger nation-states ("unity") and stronger states, to aid them in the development/transfer process. The desiderata are not tyranny and bloatedness but strategic reconstruction for enhanced effectiveness and efficiency in order to better exploit the gains from the global system process. If the construction of larger political-economic spaces is good for others, say, the Americans and Europeans, then it is good for Africans. If you are in doubt, ask the Chinese or the Indians. There is every reason to urgently progress, for example, from ECOWAS to the United States of West Africa, and, similarly, larger constructs for Southern, Eastern and Northern Africa, as a minimum (for more on this see Chinweizu, Project 2060: Business and Black Redemption,Mimeo, lecture, ESUT Management Forum, Enugu, 29 August 1997). Concluding Remarks If African states and their economies are not reconstituted along the lines I have tried to indicate, then, even under the best scenario, the prospects can be confidently predicted as dim. The task ahead is intimidating and urgent. But no one will do it for Africa except the Africans themselves. In conclusion, let me recall the words of Saint Paul, which are apposite to one of our major transfer strategies today: "We did not eat any one’s bread without paying, but with toil and labour, we worked night and day, that we might not burden any of you. It was not because we have not the right, but to give you in our conduct an example to imitate" (2 Thes, 3:8-9). Saint Paul was not only a supreme religious architect but also a practical institutional economist par excellence. If the sketch I have presented today motivates you, as you go into the world, to share the ideas with someone, then I would be gratified that this meeting was truly ordained in Heaven. And speaking of Heaven, the Kingdom of God, here is Our Lord Jesus Christ, according to Saint Luke: "... the kingdom of God is within you" (Lk 17:21). As the wise man said, the helping hand we need is at our fingertips. Ref.: Bulletin of Ecumenical Theology, Vol. 10, 1998. |