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Michael
T. Seigel I have been asked to speak on the debt issue. I hesitated to accept since I seriously doubt that I am the most qualified person here to speak on it. However, it should be a good opportunity to keep in touch with Caritas on this issue, and I decided that would be a good thing. We are in the latter half of the Jubilee year with no real resolution to the debt crisis in sight. It seems pretty unlikely now that the Jubilee 2000 Campaign will achieve its goal by the end of the year. It is therefore time to take stock, assess the situation, and begin to think about where to go from here. In that sense, then, it is the overall sense of the situation that is important, and that is what I will aim at presenting. Last year, at the Cologne Summit, the G7 promulgated an initiative which they said would bring substantial debt relief. Analysis of this initiative by debt campaigners resulted in a different analysis. The analysis by Jubilee 2000 UK, for example, argued that the Cologne Debt Initiative would only cancel that portion of the debt that the indebted countries could not pay anyway. In spite of that fairly negative analysis, I think that the Cologne Summit left us with a certain degree of optimism. If you accept the analysis of Jubilee 2000 UK, then the amount of debt reduction offered by Cologne was actually the whole amount of the debt that couldn’t be paid anyway. In other words, it was the maximum amount that could be granted without actually making any difference. That was true at least in terms of the quantity of debt reduction. The refusal of the G7 to budge on the conditionality and what appeared to be an even stronger role for the IMF were results of Cologne that boded less well for the future, and maybe they are the aspects to which we should have paid the most attention. I don’t know how many others felt this way after reading the assessments of the Cologne Summit, but I can remember finishing up with that impression that if the Cologne debt initiative were implemented as promised, and if we could achieve further commitments this year, then these further commitments would actually make a difference. So I think that the Cologne summit led us to expect something this year. In fact, the Cologne Debt Initiative was not implemented as promised. Critiques of the implementation of the Cologne Debt Initiative by debt campaigners simply point to the small number of countries that have even now begun to receive debt relief under this initiative—this in spite of the fact that some people (such as Gordon Brown, British chancellor of the exchequer made statements last year that debt relief for a number of countries would be a matter of weeks. (Actually, the G8 Research Center of the University of Toronto is fairly favourable in its evaluation of the follow up to Cologne. On the debt issue, they list all countries except the US as having essentially kept their promises by agreeing to make money available. The G8 Research Center does have a different perspective: they look at what the G8 countries have actually done in terms of their particular commitments, and their promises were basically to cancel bilateral debt for qualifying countries and to make funds available for the HIPC Initiative. Their approach is much more minimalist. They don’t look so much at whether the promised results were actually achieved.) In fact, what has been the outcome of Cologne: the demand for the formulation of a PRSP seems to have slowed down the implementation of the HIPC initiative and it seems that the extra conditionality of poverty reduction has made it more difficult for countries to qualify. the role of the IMF in the PRSP process has demanded expanded its role more into the area of development, placing the IMF even more at the centre, further marginalizing the UN, possibly even helping the IMF in its competition with the World Bank, and certainly weakening the autonomy of indebted countries.. Structural adjustment has remained a central conditionality for debt cancellation. The focus has remained on changing the indebted countries and not on changing the factors in the international economy that are causative of the debt. Creditor governments have been given the opportunity to pose, presenting themselves as in favour of debt cancellation when there si little likelihood of them every having to actually come through. A positive result is that the development of PRSPs has been the occasion in a few countries for establishing forums for consultation with civil society. Uganda has perhaps been the most successful. The rather poor implementation of Cologne was followed up by what essentially amounted to a brush off of the debt campaign at Okinawa. Where does the Campaign now stand? In spite of the brush off that the campaign got at Okinawa, the campaign has achieved some things of which we should not lose sight. The campaigns success in mobilizing people globally and in raising public awareness are clearly important. As well as a widespread mass movement, the campaign for debt cancellation has been able to win support from an increasing number of mainstream economists and economic institutions, from the media, and from governments and political leaders. The understanding and support of these groups is extremely important, and perhaps most particularly the last, the political leaders. I mean here the specifically political leaders of the indebted countries. The meeting of the Presidents from Nigeria, Algeria, South Africa and Thailand with the G7 was unprecedented. It would probably have been inconceivable without the Jubilee campaign and the other associated campaigns for debt cancellation. This is especially the case when you think that just a couple of years ago some campaigns were bemoaning the lack of participation of the government of indebted countries in the campaign. It is true that this meeting did not seem to have very much effect on the G8. In fact, reports on the meeting say that, at the meeting with the four presidents, the G8 countries recognized the inadequacy of the Cologne initiative, so it is a kind of an insult to the four presidents that they did not take stronger measures at Okinawa. However, the fact of four heads of state of indebted countries coming together over the debt issue and seeking to negotiate the issue with the G8 remains an important achievement. Assessing the Campaign I would like to ask four questions here: Has the focus on debt cancellation been appropriate? Has the G8 been the appropriate target for appeals? Has the title "Jubilee 2000" been helpful? And how have the different viewpoints within the campaign affected our effectiveness? 1. Has the focus on debt cancellation been appropriate? I believe that the real goal for all campaigners has been something a little broader than just debt cancellation. I think that the marks of a just economic order would be: a) that the well-being of all is sustained, b) that there is a certain amount of equity in economic relationships so that control is not concentrated excessively in a limited number of hands, c) that all participants in the economy are able to maintain a certain degree of autonomy and self-reliance, d) that the economy is open to the participation of all, and e) that disruptive gaps such as the gap between rich and poor diminish rather than expand. Basically what this means is that all must be enabled to participate equitably. While people may want to phrase this differently, place different emphases, or even add certain points, my guess is that almost all participants in the campaign, explicitly or implicitly, consciously or unconsciously, have similar goals in mind. Again, I am projecting my own perceptions on to others, but I think that the debt has become such a focal issue because it is so clearly caused by and causative of precisely the opposite of those goals—a deprivation of well-being, a concentration of economic control, an exclusion of many, and an increasing gap between rich and poor. The question then is whether focussing to the extent that we have on the debt as such has been effective in terms of achieving those broader goals. Firstly, let me point out that the Jubilee 2000 Campaign would not have achieved the widespread following that it did if it had not been a clearly focussed campaign with a clear-cut, concrete, and measurable goal. Debt cancellation has been such a goal, and having such a clear goal has helped the campaign become widespread. Secondly, the debt is a real and serious problem in its own right and it must be addressed as such. It is true that the debt has emerged as a result of numerous factors and is therefore a symptom of much deeper problems and inequities in the economy. But sometimes symptoms can be such serious problems in their own right that they have to be treated. If someone is bleeding, it may well be important to treat the cause of the bleeding, but it is usually also important to stop the bleeding itself. I think that the debt is much like that. The debt is a form of bleeding that sucks the lifeblood of the indebted countries. Few if any of these countries will be able to resolve their economic problems unless the debt or at least the bulk of it is cancelled. One often hears the argument that debt cancellation is not the real solution to the problem. I think that most debt campaigners agree with that. But the real question is: Can there be a real solution to the problem without debt cancellation? To this I think the answer is "No!" There is no chance that poor countries that are heavily burdened by debt will achieve well-being and the ability to participate equitably without having their debts cancelled. I personally think that it is a misrepresentation of the campaign to see it as a group of naive people over-optimistically thinking that if the debt is cancelled funds will be released that will then go towards promoting the well-being of the poor. Rather, a large proportion of people involved in the debt campaign have been involved in development activities for years and sometimes for decades. They know full well from many years of experience, that in development and in work to help the poor things rarely work out as planned. They understand the complexities involved, and for this reason, the request has not simply been for debt cancellation, but also for measures that will prevent similar debt crises in the future and for an international system of neutral arbitration. Thirdly, I think that the debt has been an appropriate tool for analysis and for education and awareness raising. The debt crisis does provide a window to look at the fundamental problems of the global economy. A study of the debt crisis highlights such things as the weakness of primary products in the global market, inequities in terms of trade, the problems of having loans denominated in the currencies of the creditors, the vulnerability of debtors when there is no neutral supervisory authority and no means of declaring insolubility, etc. I think that the campaign for debt cancellation has helped many people become conversant with issues of international economics and finance to a degree that was inconceivable four or five years ago. Those who were already involved in such campaigns may not notice this, but for most ordinary people—at least for those who had contact with the campaign—the last five years have been an important learning experience. (I am basing this on my experience with Catholic religious. There is such a higher level of awareness, and so much less of a problem of people being frightened away by technical jargon as a result of this campaign. This development may be more pronounced with Catholic religious than with other groups, since this campaign did capture the attention of the Churches, but I think that there has actually been a similar fairly widespread growth among many others. I think that campaigns to stop the MAI and the Millennium Round of the WTO were successful in part because of the awareness raising that had been achieved by the campaign for debt cancellation.) This is a very important development, because I think that the main issues civil society must deal with in coming years are going to be in the area of international economics. My conclusion on this point, then, is that the debt has been an appropriate focus, and that for the immediate future, it will continues to be such. I think we have to continue it. I think that it is a valid campaign in its own right—in that the debt needs to be forgiven. I think that it is has the capacity to fit in well with other campaigns such as those responding to the IFIs, those dealing with trade issues, or promoting an international insolvency procedure, or a Tobin Tax. And I think it is a good issue to use for promoting broader awareness of issues of economic inequity. 2. Has the G8 been the appropriate target for appeals? This is a more difficult question. I did not go to Okinawa. Instead, SEDOS sent Frans Thoolen of the Scheut Fathers. He came back with the impression that targeting the annual G8 meeting is a mistake. I had been thinking something similar myself as it became clear during the year that even the meagre promises of Cologne were not going to be kept. I am sure that those deeply involved in the campaign see it as having many levels and areas of activities, of which the annual demonstration at the G8 meeting is only one. However, the more removed from the centre a person is, the more they see the campaign as one that focuses on appeals to the G8. Certainly, it is at the time of the annual G8 meeting that the campaign is most able to mobilize its following and organize a media-grabbing event. A lot of energy goes into these appeals, and I am beginning to have doubts as to whether it is the best use of that energy. Even magazines such as the Economist have become rather critical of the annual G8 meeting. It is not really a decision making body. It might come up with strategies, but these strategies have to be ratified and implemented by the individual governments at home. The G8 meeting is a big media event, and it might be valuable to go on using it as such. But I think that there are also risks in focussing too much on the G8. The G8 can come up with what to many people will seem like a positive response and make it look like the problem is solved, but then if the individual G8 governments do not come through with the ratification and implementation, then it amounts to nothing. Alternatively, it can weaken the campaign simply by not allowing it to achieve results. Therefore, making the G8 the main focus of the campaign maybe a dead end. The campaigns against the MAI and the Millennium Round were eminently successful, and it seems to me that at least one of the reasons for that was that they actually targeted the negotiations and the negotiators themselves. They also targeted the decision making processes within the individual governments. In some countries, for example, there were threats of bringing formal charges of unconstitutionality against the MAI if it were signed. Maybe the debt campaign needs to learn from this. Maybe, instead of targeting interrgovernmental gatherings, we should look more closely at the decision making processes in creditor countries, perhaps even trying to make the debt an issue in election campaigns. Maybe distributing brochures at election time that argue the need for debt cancellation in terms of the long term well being of the creditor countries as well might help promote awareness. Obviously, the Jubilee campaigns in all countries have been targeting the decision making processes in their own countries. I am suggesting that this be made an even greater focus. I can remember having the impression that Jubilee 2000 USA seemed to be going its own way and not relating much to the international campaign, but focussing mainly on the US congress. I now rather think that they were right in doing this. 3. The name "Jubilee 2000" Use of the word "Jubilee" has given the campaign a certain power of appeal with Churches and religious people. Targeting the year 2000 has also helped to give the campaign a very specific focus. In addition, appealing for a one-off cancellation on the occasion of the millennium has made it possible to counter certain arguments against cancellation relating to moral hazard. One question is: Did the focus on the millennium work against the campaign by giving the creditors the impression that if they just resist pressure until the end of this year, the campaign will peter out or at least lose its focus? I don’t have even a suggestion to the answer to that. Another question: Has the millennium moment been lost? How do we deal with the argument of moral hazard now that the millennium has gone. A third question is with regard to the word "Jubilee" which is clearly biblically based. Did the use of this word hinder the campaign from spreading into the non-Christian world, and did it limit effectiveness with non-Christian governments. It is true that in the non-Christian world certain groups have adopted the campaign. But these are exceptional. In Japan, the campaign is dismissed as a Christian one of little relevance in a non-Christian country. In India, promoting the Jubilee 2000 campaign would lead to charges of using a campaign for social justice as a means to convert the poor to Christianity. Similar situations prevail in Moslem countries. At the Johannesburg meeting of Jubilee South, there was a small group from various non-Christian countries who met regularly throughout the conference to try to look for a way beyond this impasse. One thing is clear: if we are going to respond to global issues in a global way, then it has to be done in a way that can transcend religious differences. We finished up with a decision to find out what movements exist for promoting campaigns for social justice beyond religious boundaries. Perhaps one of the most important steps for the campaign for debt cancellation now is to try to bridge the gap created by the use of the word "Jubilee," and try to come up with a coherent global campaign. 4. How have the different viewpoints within the campaign affected our effectiveness? I think it is clear to all that there have been some unpleasant recriminations within the campaign for debt cancellation. I have the impression that this has weakened the campaign—in that it has given the impression that the campaign has been split. It seems that there have been comments on this split among the creditors. I am not really sure how much it has weakened the campaign, but I think it is likely to have encouraged the creditors to think that they don’t need to take the campaign all that seriously. To some extent, the problems seem to have more to do with personalities than with issues, and sometimes viewpoints seem to misunderstood or misrepresented. For example, I don’t think anyone in the debt campaign is in favour of having structural adjustment as a condition for debt relief. If some campaigns are interested in working with the HIPC Initiative rather than against it, it doesn’t mean that they are in favour of structural adjustment as a conditionality. As far as I can tell, the accusation that some campaigns are promoting this kind of conditionality is a misunderstanding. There are real differences in the campaign however, and I will try to address these now. I have the impression that there are two basic areas in which there are differences: a difference in the way the debt crisis is understood (which, within the campaign, is more a difference of emphasis and focus than of analysis as such), and a difference of approach in terms of how to relate to the creditors and their strategies. a. Different strategies. I will deal with the latter first. The basic difference is: do you work with the creditors and their strategies or against them. For example, do you work with the HIPC Initiative or against it. Do you work with the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, or against them. This is very much a question of strategy and does not necessarily mean that there is a difference in goals or understanding of the problem. Fore example, if someone chooses to work with the HIPC Initiative rather than against it, it does not necessarily mean that they are more tolerant of conditionality. It may simply indicate a different judgment about effectiveness. Some people may simply judge that they are more likely to get desirable results by entering into negotiations with the creditors over the HIPC Initiative than by appealing for the abolition of HIPC. Certainly EURODAD and OXFAM have addressed the HIPC Initiative and seem willing to work with it. Many groups, especially those aligned with Jubilee South want to see the HIPC Initiative totally rejected. It takes a certain amount of expertise to undertake negotiations for such things as changes in the HIPC Initiative. Not all participants in the campaign would be able to do it. Nor do I think it necessary that the campaign have one specific approach. In fact, having a broader campaign with some calling for the total abolition of the HIPC Initiative might even strengthen the hand of those who are entering into such negotiations. The important point is that the people participating in various different ways should see themselves as allies. I think that there are problems in working with the HPIC Initiative which I will come back to later, but there is also a problem with campaigning for the abolition of institutions or initiatives. The campaign for the abolition of the School of the Americas can provide an example. The outcome of this campaign was that the US congress abolished the SOA and established a clone with a different name that had exactly the same role and used exactly the same resources. I rather suspect that the same would happen if campaigns to abolish the HIPC Initiative or the World Bank or the IMF or the WTO were successful. Very similar institutions with very similar roles but different names would immediately be established, and we would have to start our campaigns again. I therefore think that as much as possible, campaign goals should be positive: we should aim at establishing something rather than abolishing something. So on this point of different strategies, I personally am in favour of this multiplicity of strategies. But I think that recriminations because of differences of approach are counter-productive. b. Different understandings of the debt crisis. The basic grasp of the problem seems to be the most important single issue in relation to the debt: How is it understood? There is a proverb that says: if you hit the bullseye on the wrong target, you have missed. Without a proper understanding of the debt crisis, any attempts at a solution will, at their very best, amount to hitting the bullseye on the wrong target. The most important question in this regard is: To what extent is the debt caused by problems within the indebted countries, and to what extent are the causes exogenous? The biggest difference in viewpoints here would be between the viewpoint of the campaigna nd the viewpoint of the creditors, then differences within the campaign would imply varying differences from the standpoint of the creditors. Certainly, the World Bank and the IMF attribute the debt crisis to bad economic policies and management and bad governance within the indebted countries. Without such an analysis, the HIPC Initiative would not make sense. A number of mainstream economists who approach the question analytically, from the standpoint of economics rather than from the standpoint of any particular campaign, also have a similar analysis. Among these economists and creditors, there is some recognition of inappropriate lending policies. The IMF has recognized that "the motivation for much of the commercial lending and guaranteeing of loans was the stimulation of their own exports, protecting or creating domestic employment, as well as the benefits of cementing diplomatic relations." But the analysis does not go beyond this. One looks in vain for some recognition that the very vulnerability of commodities in the world market is a cause of the debt crisis, or that terms of trade have been a cause, or that loans denominated in the currency of the creditor can be a problem for the debtor, or the very fact of international trade being carried on in the currencies of the main creditors is a contributing factor to the crisis. You can see this divergence in ways the debt is understood in the different reactions to the Uganda’s loss of "debt sustainability": some attribute it to fluctuations in the price of commodities and others to military spending. I have the impression that creditors and mainstream economists do in fact recognize that the vulnerability of primary producers in the world market, terms of trade, denominating loans in the currency of the creditor, etc., are causal factors in the debt crisis. But these factors are accepted as part of the necessary and given framework of the economy within which we must seek a solution to the crisis, rather than as factors that can be open to question and negotiation. There do seem to be similar differences within the debt campaign. Even if there are not basic differences of analysis, there is a difference in emphasis, in the way that we dwell more on some aspects of the debt crisis than on others. It should now be clear what the problem is that I see with the HIPC Initiative. The HIPC Initiative addresses only problems within the indebted countries. While appeals and negotiations to change the criteria for debt sustainability in the HIPC Initiative, to introduce humanitarian considerations into its conditionality, and even to drop structural adjustment from its conditionality, may lead to real improvements in the Initiative, I do not see any possibility of the HIPC Initiative actually addresses the international strucutral problems that lie behind the debt. I do not say that we should end negotiations with the HIPC Initiative. Indeed, if an improvement in the Initiative is possible, we should get it. But it should not be the whole of the campaign. The post-Okinawa Debt Campaign With that, I would like to go on to discussing how we address the debt crisis from now on. 1. Promoting a holistic and integral understanding of the debt crisis In face of the tendency of many to focus only or mainly on the failings of the indebted countries, we should promote an integral understanding of the debt crisis that takes into consideration the various causal factors that exist. Some of these factors relate to specific historical situations such as the oil crisis, the approaches to development in the 1970s, the Cold War, etc. There are lessons to be learned from these factors about the need for proper accountability for creditors, neutral arbitration in dealing with debt crisis, etc. But there are also structural factors to which I have already referred. The relative weakness of primary producers, the fact that trade is carried out mainly in the currencies of the creditors and loans are denominated in these currencies is another. It is important that all these issues be addressed. That means that we have to go on promoting a holistic and integral understanding of the debt, and go on questioning the very framework within which the international economy functions. As I said earlier, we have made progress in awareness raising among politicians and mainstream economists. We must continue that. But we must continue it also among ourselves. I have the definite impression that even within the campaign, these structural issues get much less attention than they deserve and there is a tendency to accept the basic framework of the world economy as a given. This may sound a little extremist, but I think that our analysis of the debt should include a "hermeneutics of suspicion." A hermeneutics of suspicion says that if someone is benefiting from a situation, then the possibility should be considered that they arranged the situation so that they could receive that benefit. The debt crisis and the concentration of control in the hands of the multilateral lending institutions has given control of the economies of the indebted countries to these institutions and to the dominant creditors. The imposition of structural adjustment programs has been a kind of enforced liberalization of capital accounts. It should be clear that substantial benefits have accrued to the developed world, at least in the short term. So to what extent has this been planned, and to what extent is it going to interfere with the possibility of winning debt cancellation (which would involve the relinquishing of control). This has important implications for whether we approach the problem mainly through negotiation, through appeals to conscience, or through pressure. Actually, human motivations are rarely pure, and that means both that they are rarely purely good and also that they are rarely purely evil. Therefore, I reaffirm my former conclusion that a multiplicity of approaches is appropriate. 2. Highlighting the injustice of the debt. There are multiple dimensions of the debt that make it unjust. Some of the main factors are: the very fact that it arose out of structural imbalances such as the weakness of commodities in the global market, lack of access of developing countries to markets in developed countries, denomination of loans in creditors currencies, fluctuating interest and exchange rates, etc. lack of accountability such as creditors not being held to account for irresponsible loans, donor agencies and other organizations that promote development not being held to account for failed projects and bad policies, corrupt rulers being able to pass off their debts to subsequent governments while they retain their Swiss bank accounts, a substantial degree of complicity of creditors with these governments, etc. an excessive degree of interest resulting from the accumulation of compound interest over long periods. the demand for payment from impoverished countries after decades and even centuries of exploitation of these countries. How do we relate to this injustice? I think that Jubilee South has a point in arguing that the injustices listed above are essentially an outgrowth and prolongation of colonialism and therefore that the whole debt of the developing countries is unjust and should be cancelled not as an act of charity but as an act of justice. Indeed, in terms of pure justice, it is hard to deny the argument that the real debt is owed by the developed countries to the developing countries. Recognition of this injustice is important. In recent years, we have seen numerous political and religious leaders called on to apologize for past injustices—the Pope for the oppression of Jews and for other wrongs of the Church, the Emperor of Japan for the oppression of Korea, the government of Australia for the treatment of aboriginals, President Clinton for slavery, etc. These acts of apology are extremely important. When an injustice has been done, recognizing it as an injustice—even if nothing can be done for the victim—is an important part of reconciliation. When a wrong goes unrecognized, there is an implicit slight to the dignity of the victim—as if to say that the victim is not worthy of redress, that somehow the exploitation was okay. In the arena of the world economy, after centuries of colonial exploitation and neocolonial economic control, there is a need for reconciliation and restoration of equity which cannot be achieved without clear 3. The establishment of international laws and international procedures for the protection of sovereign debtors. As you all know, there are many proposals in this regard and I am sure that many of you are more familiar with them than I am. I will try to give a brief summary of the issues that I think must be covered by such laws and procedures. It must be determined that sovereign debtors have a prior responsibility to the well being of their people and that therefore needs related to health, education welfare and a certain amount of investment for economic growth must have priority over debt servicing. The must be international legal protection for this prior responsibility. International lending must be carried out in way that does not inevitably lead to debt crises, and therefore the forms in which finance is made available should be determined by the prospects of the project to generate income. Where finance is intended for projects such as healthcare and disaster relief which cannot be expected to produce any monetary return on the investment, the financing should take the form of grants and not of loans. (The recent offer of the US to loan $1 billion to Southern Africa to deal with the AIDS crisis was a cynical offer which, had it been accepted, would have inevitably lead to a debt crisis). financing for projects that will be generate profit only indirectly (such as infrastructure projects) should be at concessional, simple interest rates, and there should be a delay in the requirement to service the debt until such time as there is an actual return on the investment. Projects that are essentially business investments and are intended to de directly profit generating could be financed at market interest rates. Normally, this financing would be carried out by private investors. Even private investors are not willing, this would raise the question of whether more concessional aid is not necessary. These above principles could be modified according to the degree of development of the country. Since the goal is the restoration of equity and wellbeing after decades and centuries of exploitation, sucha concessional approach would not seem an inappropriate degree of charity. Some form of neutral international arbitration is needed both to oversee the implementation of the above, to sort out solutions so as to prevent fluctuations of prices and exchange rates from having an undue effect on sovereign debtors, and to resolve crises when the occurr. In general, I think that if we look at the issues of justice and peace that we struggle with, we realize that they are always related to two facts: the area of international relationships, including financial and economic relationships, is a largely lawless terrain. There is no higher power that can control despotic governments. At domestic levels we have come a long way, at least in most countries, in dealing with lawlessness, and many of the lessons that have been learned are apropos for the developmetn of international law—ideas such as the idea of limiting the influence of vested interests and maintaining the mutual independence of administrative, legislative and judicial dimensions. In a certain sense, establishing this kind of international law is what we are all about. Within the Church, I think that we need to do more work on the ethics of debt in our social teaching. Interestingly enough, in spite of all that has been said about the link between jubilee and debt cancellation in the past few years, debt cancellation was not part of the Jubilee Year in the Bible. Rather it is part of the Sabbath Year—to be implemented every seven years. Interestingly enough, I do not find that the Pentateuch speaks of almsgiving. Rather, if someone was in need, there was an obligation to help that person through a loan, but the loan was to be forgiven in the Sabbath. It seems that the Pentateuch tries to find a path between the dependency that can be generated by charity and the enslavement that can be created by debt. For centuries, when lending was a response to people’s needs, the Church forbade the taking of interest. When loans came to be made as a means of investment and profit, this prohibition became unrealistic. But permitting the taking of interest eventually led to interest being taken even for loans in a time of crisis and need that would never generate the kind of profit that would make repayment possible. An ethic that takes all these things into consideration needs to be developed. Finally, let us continue the campaign with more action as well as more awareness raising. by continuing the lobbying that we have been carrying out. by supporting networking among the indebted countries, including a possible debtors cartel, and repudiations of the debt. approaching the issue through the courts. what about boycotts of countries that refuse to cancel?
Sources: OXFAM. Debt Relief and Poverty Reduction: Strengthening the Linkage Brett D. Schaefer. Debt in Developing Countries: History, Structure, and Efforts to Address Unsustainable External Debt Burdens. file:///E|/I/IFI Advisory Commission/CDPJO.html Tim Allen and Diana Weinhold Dropping the Debt for the New Millennium:is it Such A Good Idea? London School of Economics and Political Science, Working Paper Series, No.00-09, May 2000 Prof. Jeffrey Sachs, Dr. Kwesi Botchwey, Mr. Maciej Cuchra, Ms. Sara Sievers.. Implementing Debt Relief for the HIPCs. Center for International Development. Harvard University. August 1999.
Ref.: Text from the author. (Conference given at Caritas Internationalis, 5 September 2000).
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