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Rev.
Dr Aquiline Tarimo, SJ Introduction Many people consider the problem of ethnicity in Africa to be perennial. Most problems such as favoritism, sociopolitical disorder, manipulation of ethnic identity for selfish gains, ethnic hatred, civil wars, and so forth, are all attributed to ethnicity. Although ethnic hostilities are constantly revealed in politically motivated murders, torture, unjustified imprisonment, disappearances, and denial of human rights for the targeted ethnic groups, a critical evaluation of positive and negatives aspects of ethnicity remains a taboo in public. Even in the Church ethnic tensions are strongly experienced. Yet, for unknown reasons, such a social problem has not adequately become a part of theological reflections. Perhaps, this is because the Church is an integral part of the problem. Although many people, from the African perspective, speak about ethnicity in its degenerated form only a few scholars have really reflected seriously on its nature, development, and impact on social life. Some of the available literature on this subject, however, lack a critical examination of it in relation to the changing meaning of ethnic identity, ethnic loyalty, common good, political competition, and religion. Consequently, this situation, in a way, has accelerated the process of misinterpreting the whole phenomenon of ethnicity. From my viewpoint, the problem of ethnicity in Africa can thoroughly be understood if we take seriously the following questions. First, how is ethnicity and ethnic loyalty understood today? Second, how is ethnicity related to the conflict of loyalties? Third, how has the dynamism of ethnic loyalty fashioned the African understanding of common good and politics? Fourth, has the Church managed to stand above ethnic loyalty and the tension it generates? Fifth, how can we promote a constructive way of approaching the issue of ethnicity in contemporary Africa? Given the importance of these questions the subject of ethnicity deserves a critical analysis. The focus and presentation of this essay follows the framework of the aforementioned questions. The Meaning and Nature Ethnicity The term ethnicity,1 as applied to Africa, refers to a group of people sharing a common name, language, symbols, sociopolitical organization, religious beliefs, cultural heritage, sometimes territory, common ancestry (descent), and a group identity. Ethnicity, or a sense of peoplehood, has its foundation in combined remembrances of past and present experiences, common inspirations, value systems, norms, and expectations. Most of the indigenous peoples of Africa have lived and continue to lead their lives within the framework of an ethnic group. If a person is in difficulties, it is common for this person to call for help from his or her ethnic group. In urban areas ethnicity is appealed to when people are in need of financial support, political support, and solidarity. For many people, ethnicity stands as a symbol of communal identity, solidarity, security, familiarity, and cooperation. Be it in rural or urban areas, ethnicity remains a powerful force, although it "varies like temperature, from time to time, depending on prevailing circumstances".2 The meaning and nature of ethnicity is difficult to grasp unless we relate it to the changing structures of local institutions and States.3 Without that connection, we will continue using old answers for new questions. We have to consider cultural, socioeconomic, and political changes that have been taking place in African societies and how they have refashioned ethnic identities. From my point of view, ethnicity, as far as Africa is concerned, assumes a triple history: precolonial, colonial, and post-colonial. In the precolonial period, ethnic groups were more rural, regional, homogeneous, and there was less competition between ethnic groups for the scarce economic resources than is the case today. I am not saying that traditional communities had no economic difficulties. What I want to point out, as J. Lonsdale argues, is that in precolonial African societies, there was a recognized "art of living in a reasonably peaceful way" without a State in the way it is understood in the West.4 During the colonial period, small ethnic groups, under the principle of divide-and-rule, were given new features because they were forced to merge. Because of the ethnic competition for the scarce economic resources and political power, each ethnic group tends to fight to have a president coming from their group. For them, the president will loot the State for his ethnic group. In other words, the president is not for the state, but his ethnic group. This is the root cause of the struggle to control the State. Ethnic strategies are often connected with the resources of modern economy, for example in gaining employment, education, securing loans, and seizing appointments for lucrative offices. Through this example, we can therefore conclude that the competition for the limited economic resources within the State, in the post-colonial era, to a certain extent, has changed the structure and the meaning of ethnicity in Africa. Let us now explore the source of the conflict of loyalties. Ethnicity and Conflict of Loyalties The problem of ethnicity in Africa is also linked with the question of competing loyalties. In many parts of Africa, ethnic loyalties have risen above other loyalties. The reason is that during the colonial era there were a few economic or political incentives which ethnicity could offer. Today, ethnic loyalty may mean a quick promotion in one’s status especially in places of work. Even the internal administration of churches has shown that their loyalty often lies more with their ethnic groupings rather than with Christianity. In time of problems, religious leaders, as political leaders, take refuge in their ethnic groups. A good example here is the genocide that happened in Rwanda. In this event, Christians could not appeal to their Christian conscience to address the hatred that existed between Hutus and Tutsis.5 Even those in positions of authority like bishops could not raise their conscience above the criterion of ethnicity. Christianity, for many, is like a coat which can be put on only when it is needed; when it is not, it is forgotten in the wardrobe. This is the sign that Christianity is still on the periphery. We will return to this point in the later stage of our discussion. How can we integrate ethnic loyalty within the structure of State? In carrying out this project, the question that we have to struggle with should be: How can we reconcile ethnic loyalty with nationalism? To begin with, we have to acknowledge that a leader has "commitments not simply to general values and ideals but also to concrete people".6 The process of decision-making and the kind of common good that we are committed to are heavily dependent on the persons and groups which claim one’s loyalty.7 Loyalty can be influenced by interest group, cultural group, religious group, or self-interest desires which use others as a ladder to acquire popularity, power and wealth. Consequently, moral conflicts in public life can be fruitfully looked at as conflicts between these concrete commitments to various groups. As a way of demonstrating this point, the analysis of Abner Cohen on the relationship between African cultures and modern politics in urban areas reveals that [ethnic] organizations camouflage or deny [their] existence in public and its members will adopt a low profile and attempt to fade into the general social landscape. At the same time, however, its members must know about one another and should be able to recognize one another as co-members in order to coordinate their activities in the interests of the group and to avail themselves of the privileges of membership. In other words, they have to be visible to one another, but invisible as a group in public.8 This concern brings us close to the question of the plurality of loyalties which is an important clue in exploring the relationship between ethnic loyalty and the common good in Africa. A leader can only be just if he or she is able to find a balance between competing loyalties. This is possible by forming social structures that are founded upon the principle of overlapping loyalties. This is the only possibility that can keep leaders from becoming opportunists or persons who advocate interests of a particular group. This project entails "weighing competing loyalties and competing goods and to act in a way which attends to their rightful claims".9 The question of respecting loyalties of ethnic communities is an important part of forming a cohesive political society. As such, the process of harmonizing competing loyalties must be achieved by maintaining a balance between the State and ethnic communities. This demand therefore brings us to the point of examining the relationship between ethnic loyalties and the common good. The Relationship Between Ethnic Loyalty and the Common Good Ethnicity affects, directly or indirectly, our understanding of common good. While ethnic sentiments may undercut the nationalistic approach, they may also be a force that enhances any sense of nationhood and common good.10 Despite the rhetoric of national unity, the typical African’s understanding of common good, solidarity, and community remains limited to the circles of particular ethnic groups. This situation shows that important issues such as how to form a nation based on traditional values and political consensus were not addressed sufficiently after independence. African leaders remained stuck in the political ideology of uhuru (freedom). They did not know that the political struggle of uhuru was a temporary ideology. Involvement of an ethnic group in a bigger group like a State should be understood from the perspective that enables each ethnic group to develop deliberative powers and a sense of purpose in search for the common good. In this context, access to a multiplicity of groups promotes a diversity of experiences and interests, and enables each group to participate fully in the common structure laid down by consensus. The idea of political consensus can articulate new perspectives and preferences which will eventually enter into the balancing process, dissolving political conflicts, and creating local institutions that guarantee fairness. This approach gives priority to innovation and change that articulates new perspectives and preferences that eventually seep into the balancing process, affecting the shape of interest groups. Pluralism protects rights of individuals, groups, and promotes cohesion and consensus based on consent. A balance of interests achieved by the free bargaining of groups in society creates a comprehensive conception of the common good and is thus a more equitable way of dealing with competition among ethnic groups and ensuring equal opportunity for all. Such an understanding, in turn, will enhance cooperation between different groups within the society. The task of African societies is therefore collectively to envision and formulate a new concept of the common good based on ethnic identities, political consensus, and people’s consent. To develop such a vision does not mean that ethnic differences must be denied. Not at all. What is important is to orient such identities toward an overlapping consensus which fosters the common good. This task entails developing a more profound unity that underlines ethnic differences. It is not a unity that imposes the sameness, but a unity that demands equality, freedom, participation, and "creativity in the interest of moral good".11 This way of proceeding, as I have mentioned earlier, is important because the African understanding of the common good is still frequently limited to the framework of the ethnic well-being. That is why most city-dwellers, as observed by Goran Hyden, are sensitive to the needs and interests centered on their village of origin and ethnic group.12 Place of birth and ethnicity are seen as having influence over cities, despite the fact that cities are the seats of power and wealth. The understanding of the common good follows the same framework. Let me give two examples to illustrate this point. During his reign, Mobutu Seseseko, the former president of the Democratic Republic of Congo (formally ZaVre), used State funds to construct an airport in his village, Gbadolite. In the same way, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the former president of Ivory Coast, built the State House and a basilica in his village, Yamoussoukro. These two examples show that ethnic identities often remain the point of departure and basic building-block for the concept of common good that an African nation intends to pursue. Politicization of Ethnic Groups and the Abuse of Ethnic Consciousness Ethnicity acts as a pole around which group members are mobilized and compete effectively for State-controlled power, scarce economic resources, and constitutional protections. Ethnicity, as used in this context, refers to a subjective perception of common origins, historical memories, ties, and aspirations. Under the leadership of political opportunists, members of the ethnic group are urged to form an organized political action-group to maximizing their corporate political, economic, and social interests. Conflicts involving ethnicity could be summed up as those advocating interests of "culturally distinct peoples, [ethnic groups], or clans in heterogeneous societies who are locked in rivalries about the distribution of or access to power",13 and in which those concerned have certain regions as their stronghold and tend to follow the strategy of ethnonationalism. Most of the internal and political conflicts found in Africa involve ethnic groups struggling for control of their region (as it is the case in Angola, Kenya, Chad, Nigeria, Sudan, and Ethiopia), or even struggling to control the entire country (e.g., Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia and Sierra Leone). What happens is that ethnic groups engage themselves in a struggle for power and privilege with other ethnic groups within the political frameworks. In this battle, each ethnic group will tend to advocate its distinctiveness in different ways. Bear in mind that this phenomenon does not happen simply because of conservatism. Rather, ethnic groups are also interest groups whose members share some common economic and political interests.14 It is essential to note that people do not kill one another merely because of the cultural and ethnoregional differences. They kill each other when these differences are used to create divisions, unhealthy competitions and hatred between ethnic groups. The situation does not become explosive until such a climate of social relationship is extended to the socioeconomic and political spheres. In different ways, ethnicity is often used by elite groups in socioeconomic and political competition. The factor of ethnicity plays a significant role in informal relationships. Ethnicity is a live political and economic issue. It is not just a mere cultural identity limited to friendship, marriage, and rituals. Some politicians at regional and national levels allocate to their ethnic groups considerable State resources to extend their influence and control. Without scruples, such politicians intend to maximize their support and their access to resources in competition with rival politicians through ethnic groups. Consequently, this practice breeds corruption, rivalry, hatred, and conflict between ethnic groups. The competition for political power and scarce economic resources has become a way of life in African societies. According to Solofo Randrianja, elites encourage the emergence of an ethno-nationalism in order to mobilize supporters. This type of politicized ethnicity makes its appearance when nationalism extends the field of action of the ethnic community from purely cultural and social spheres to that of economy and politics. The progressive transformation of Inkatha, which began as a cultural association, into a political organization used by apartheid, is a good example of this.15 When ethnic groups are politicized, ethnicity moves from the private sphere to the public domain. Those who mastermind this transition work for political parties that serve the interests of the elite. The practice of politicizing ethnic groups appeals to cultural identities for its effectiveness. Elite political leaders cooperate with cultural intermediaries such as chiefs and religious leaders in using cultural identity for political maneuvers. In this process, ethnic identities are reformulated to suit their political agenda. Political opportunists proclaim themselves as representatives of the ethnic group while always promoting their interests in the first instance. "They combine knowledge and power in a context where the colonial economy of predation, except in a few rare cases, has left the state as the principal source of wealth and social advancement".16 Politicization of ethnic groups appeals to the ethnic solidarity based on ties of blood-relationships. This practice takes the form of a conservative return to the grassroots of ethnic identities. The appeal to group symbols is used to construct a sense of cohesion which makes it easier for them to mobilize people. Sometimes they use cultural slogans to arouse the emotions of the people and make them accept even what they do not understand. Interest groups competing for scarce economic resources, "often invoke traditional sentiments to reinforce their appeal".17 The success of political leaders in winning popular backing depends upon the trust which they inspire, and ultimately on their ability to obtain material benefits for their faction, in the form perhaps of a government job or loan, a school or clinic, a road or electric supply. In this case, "we are dealing with a kind of patronage politics, with economic resources used as political currency to enable the leadership to buy support for their policies".18 Since political and bureaucratic leaders may also appeal to ethnic identity to fulfil their ambitions, the practice of politicizing ethnic groups becomes one cause among many causes of ethnic conflicts. By appealing to ethnic loyalties and affinities political leaders urge people to keep allegiance to those who represent ethnic interests. The way of persuading people to support politicians appeals to the traditional methods of obeying and supporting a chief. Ordinary people feel that such politicians are about to restore the traditional political systems which ensured participation of all. But the truth is that political opportunists, under the cover of African cultures, apply principles of manipulation and predation to serve their own interests. The consequence of using these principles is that ethnic groups are trained to acquire an attitude of concentrating on winning favors and fighting for the limited national resources. Their participation in public affairs is reduced to a game of advocating ethnic interests rather than building structures that can guarantee equality, justice and development for all. As a result, people no longer see hard work as the source of economic success. As far as this practice is concerned, one can argue that ethnicity, when misused, destroys local institutions and the sense of the common good. First, it tends to substitute values of human rights and equality among citizens in favor of particular groups. Second, it reduces equal and fair access to resources to rivalries between groups rather than treating it as a question of social justice. As far as elections are concerned, "voters feel as though [they are] not electing representatives but ethnic mini-presidents".19 Voters do not appeal to the criteria of economic performance, health services, education, human rights, and constitutional change. The important question for them is how to enable their interest-group to control the State. "The rationale used is basic: let us ensure that many of ours control government offices".20 Political leaders convince ethnic groups to believe that they rule the country on their behalf. The president is seen as an ethnic ruler. People believe that if one of theirs hold a high post, it is held in trust for the benefit of their ethnic community alone. Following the same framework, political parties become ethnic parties slated for ethnic bargaining to acquire political powers that would allow them to loot the State. Most political parties in Africa are handled like ethnic associations by elites who make a career in politics. It is from this perspective that parties promote ethnic nationalism and ethnic politics. Others see the introduction of multi-party democracy as a way of decentralizing the State in favor of ethno-nationalism. Consequently, this practice creates mutual mistrust between ethnic groups. Those who belong to the less dominant ethnic groups feel left out and discriminated against by the system. In turn, they feel obliged to act, legally or illegally, to ensure their survival. This is, in fact, the root cause of African conflicts. Let us now turn to the practice of ethnicity in the Church and its consequences. Ethnicity and the Church The question of ethnic loyalty and ethnic tension exist also in the Church. This situation has robbed of the Church its ability to create a new community. According to D. W. Waruta, "most religious groups and denominations, closely scrutinized, are very [ethnic] in their composition and leadership. Those that happen to be multiethnic with a national outlook are plagued with internal [interethnic] conflicts".21 Such a framework shows that the issue of ethnicity operates and creates tension in the Church as it does in the political arena. In view of trying to understand the operation of this phenomenon one has to find out the real causes of this situation. As far as the history of African Christianity is concerned, this situation is linked to the method applied by certain missionaries of concentrating their effort of evangelization within a given ethnic group, "thus producing a largely [one ethnic] denomination. [In the process of maintaining their dominance, such ethnic groups tend to] conduct their worship services in their ethnic languages, thus keeping out all others".22 Concerning power distribution and administration, leaders such as bishops from the mainstream churches are often appointed and assigned duties basically on ethnic arrangements as more and more ioceses are created along ethnic boundaries. These churches are threatened by the clamour for each ethnic group to have its own bishop! Sometimes such arrangements are justified by language and cultural considerations.23 On the same point, Aylward Shorter argues: it would be surprising if the Church were not both a victim and an accomplice of ethnocentrism. Up till now, Catholics have been reticent about the ways in which they have been affected by the "ethnic disease." Church authorities approached the ethnic problem with extreme caution, creating ethnically encapsulated dioceses, and aligning with ethnically oriented governments. Even so, it was always possible to avoid appointing bishops who were ethnic outsiders, or who belonged to unpopular minority ethnic groups.24 Christians believe that the Church is called to promote a multiethnic community of faith, where there is no Jew and gentile, but one family of God built on faith, love, and hope. This teaching, however, has not yet become a reality in Africa. The reason is that even the Church has not been untainted by [ethnicity] and therefore it too has lost the ability to create the new community . . . The challenge for modern Africa and particularly for the guardians of public morality who include the Church is how to confront this problem and transform it from a negative to a positive reality.25 When Augustine Karekezi, a Rwandan Jesuit, was asked in an interview to link the role of the Church in Rwanda with what happened there in 1994 he said: My faith as a Christian has been affected seriously, in the sense that I cannot realize that such evil could happen in a country where so many people are Christians and where there are so many Catholics (over 65 percent) with such influence in education. What have we been doing as Christians and as priests? How can we preach the love of God, the compassion of God, in this situation? All these questions rise from an experience of the deep mystery of evil, evil that is so consistent and so strong that its power is prevailing.26 One may deceive oneself by saying that the conflict of Rwanda was a unique case and that such questions do not apply elsewhere in Africa. The fact is that such questions cannot be limited to the Christians of Rwanda. The experience of Rwanda should be taken as a typical example to all Christians of Africa. The experience of Rwanda reminds us that all Christians from Africa are called to ask themselves serious questions especially about the relevance of their Christian faith in the earthly life. This means we have to scrutinize the kind of evangelization found in Africa—our preaching and celebration of sacraments in relation to social relationships—all these must be scrutinized very carefully. In addition, the question that can guide us in this reflection should be: Does our Christian faith make any difference in our everyday life? There is no way we can avoid confronting this question. To do that will be the same as trying to run away from the challenges of the earthly life. The challenge of the African Church is how can it appeal to the gospel values to construct a new community with new social relationships. This is a serious challenge because the Church is considered to be a part of the problem of ethnic hatred and as such it has failed to stand above this situation. An expression which reveals this attitude says: "the blood of ethnicity is thicker than the water of baptism." There are six points which support this attitude. First, for many years the Church has been using the structure of ethnicity for evangelization. Second, the Church has been reluctant to address the problem of ethnic hatred openly. Third, Bishops’ Pastoral Letters have not yet succeeded in transforming people’s consciences. This is because there is no cooperation and active participation of Christians from the grassroots communities as well as an integrated vision. Fourth, an ethnic bias is also held by some Church’s leaders. Fifth, with regard to social problems, the Church has failed to assume its commitment and to be self-critical.Sixth, there is no ecumenical collaboration in dealing with social problems. We can conclude that the example of the Rwandan holocaust underlines the foreignness, artificiality, and ambiguity of the kind of Christianity found in Africa. This is not a condemnation, but a matter of fair examination of conscience. There is no doubt that the Church has failed to be the conscience of society in Africa. I do not, however, intend to argue that Christianity is automatically able to overcome the sinful nature of a human being. My argument is that the Church has failed to create even a minimum awareness to defend basic human values and rights. This situation has been created by the fact that the Church has done very little to link its mission with social questions. Furthermore, the kind of religious knowledge emphasized in Africa remains focused and entangled in theological propositions which concern mostly the nature of God and the "salvation of the soul." This means the Church has done very little in promoting integral human development which includes awareness in social justice, human rights, common good, and social responsibility. In brief, the African Church lacks a "theology of life." A Constructive Approach to Ethnicity The problems confronting African societies in the modern world are numerous. And some of the problems are cultural in the sense that they are related to cherished practices and attitudes inherited from indigenous cultures. It can be said that such problems do not only result from the imposition of European colonial rule with its concomitant introduction of European cultural values and institutions. Some of the problems are related to the African capacity to grapple with, and adjust to, the aftermath of colonial rule and its institutions. Likewise, the problem of ethnicity is closely related with the capacity of African governments to integrate ethnic identities into political society. According to David Lamb, ethnicity is one of the most difficult concepts to grasp, and one of the most essential in understanding Africa. Publicly, modern Africa deplores it. Kenya’s President Daniel Arap Moi calls it the cancer that threatens to eat out the very fabric of our nation. Yet almost every African politician, practices it—most African presidents are more [ethnic] chief than national statesman—and it remains perhaps the most potent force in day-to-day African life. It is a factor in wars and power struggles. It often determines who gets jobs, who gets promoted, who gets accepted to a university, because by its very definition [ethnicity] implies sharing among members of the extended family, making sure that your own are looked after first. To give a job to a fellow [ethnic member] is not nepotism, it is an obligation. For a politician or military leader to choose his closest advisers and bodyguards from the ranks of his own [ethnic group] is not patronage, it is a good common sense. It ensures security, continuity, and authority.27 We have to acknowledge that the real question is not how to eradicate ethnicity, but how to integrate it into social relationships. We cannot afford throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Even the efforts of introducing democratic ideals in Africa will not succeed without taking into account the issue of ethnicity. Any project, be it political, economic, or religious, which involves the mobilization of people must first take into account the cultural contexts in which individuals live rather than those in which someone may think they ought to be living. The point is that the process of building democratic institutions will succeed if and only if we start with what people are and from where they are. Many studies of ethnicity concentrate on justifying the idea that sociopolitical organization based on ethnicity is a primitive model. And in most cases such an approach suggests that if Africa wants to make progress it must first of all eradicate ethnicity. This approach has influenced many African leaders. Consequently, many leaders think that ethnicity will disappear as the process of urbanization gains momentum. They conceive the existence of ethnic loyalties and affinities as "some sort of a primordial carryover, a traditional, or atavistic residue, to be cured or erased with the march of modernity".28 In addition to that, ethnicity is seen as a barrier to political integration and impediment to attaining the essence of nationhood and progress. I do not agree with them. My argument is that when people of different origins come together in urban areas within a short period of time while maintaining ties with their home areas and constantly recreating in homogenous groups, their ethnic identity and loyalty remain substantially unchanged.29 Although urbanization brings changes in cultural traditions, these changes cannot happen at once. The feeling of belonging to an ethnic group may, in fact, be stronger in towns than within a more homogeneous rural society. Ethnicity is reinforced in urban areas because of the opposition and diversity found in these places. Evidence of this supports my conclusion that urbanization, high levels of education, and high social status do not necessarily decrease ethnic awareness. Ethnicity provides the content and the deeper explanation of the nation-state. Whatever point of view is adopted, the question of ethnicity must be approached in a positive way. Ethnic identities and loyalties cannot be suppressed by the State. They need not be destroyed. What should be destroyed, instead, should be the practice of manipulating them. If we accept the importance of ethnicity, however, we must be ready to grapple with three questions. First, with regard to the issue of multi-ethnicity in Africa, what form should the state assume? Second, how can we reconcile the rights of minority and majority groups? Third, how can we order the conflict of interests among ethnic groups in the changing world? Third, what form should the concept of common good assume due to the economic disparity that exist between ethnic groups? Fourth, how can we harmonize ethnic languages? These questions could be answered adequately if we acknowledge that each ethnic group has some voice in shaping socially binding decisions. However, the strength of ethnicity is a two-edged sword. Ethnicity, on one hand, when abused, can be the root of internal problems connected with human rights and social justice.30 On the other hand, when appropriated properly, ethnicity can be a positive ingredient that guarantees the realization of the idea of civil society by enhancing participation, integration of loyalties, and commitment to the public good. In most cases, ethnicity is manifested as a form of resistance against the oppressive structure of State. It could also be said that the problem of ethnicity is related to the crisis of citizenship, lack of political consensus, the struggle to survive, sociopolitical and economic insecurity, and the lack of an agreed-upon concept of common good. While ethnicity cannot in itself form the basis of modern social organization, its reality and hold over African people cannot be denied. Acknowledging and providing this reality with a democratic form, however limited, that meets the demands of peace and collective prosperity in our times seems more sensible than denying its reality in the face of the numerous problems, from civil wars to [ethnic] patronage today.31 We must perceive ethnicity as a process that involves negotiating identity within groups while maintaining ethnic differences. The failure to recognize the power of ethnic identity will continue to create political instability and lack of cohesion, and exacerbate the situation of civil unrest found in many African countries. The problem of ethnicity in Africa is not a problem of primordial communal sentiments, sentiments that impede the unification of the State. Rather, it is a problem of incomplete structural integration. African states have failed to modify strong ethnic identification in favor of more national ones while at the same time not undermining the rights of ethnic communities. Whatever the case, ethnicity is not a negative reality or evil in itself as it has been portrayed by the forces of colonization and post-colonial politics. The fact is that ethnic consciousness becomes harmful when abused. Henry Okullu makes the same point. He argues: Let it be known, however, that [ethnic] grouping is not hereby wholly condemned. [Ethnic] affiliation as an extended family system is a great asset in nation building especially when acting as a moral retaining influence upon, and a means of security for, its members. It can be argued that [an ethnic] as a larger family unit is an order of creation. A nation, some people will argue, is not an aggregate of individuals, but rather a unity of independent institutions, of which [ethnic] grouping is one. If such is true then [ethnic] groups are a very strong foundation upon which a strong nation can be built. To do this effectively it is necessary to know how to distinguish between that which belongs to the [ethnic group] and that which belongs to the nation.32 It is unrealistic to believe that a State can ignore the structure of ethnicity without negative consequences. On the other hand, it is a mistake to believe that State affairs should be dictated from the viewpoint of one ethnic group as it is the case in Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, and so on. It is often argued by political scientists that economic insecurity makes self-interest seekers recruit men and women of their own ethnic groups into authoritative positions for the interest of their ethnic groups and region. Ethnicity, taken from this perspective, creates a loss of national culture—a culture which would be enriched immensely by the absorption of the existing different cultural backgrounds. If ethnic identity is positively appropriated, it can become a national value, together with the weaknesses and strengths of that ethnic group. Ethnicity is a means of cultural support. To sum up, the significance of ethnicity has not diminished with the formation of nation-states. There are several reasons. First, family, clan and ethnic group are still the essential structures of social relationships in African societies.33 Second, "one’s identity is ethnic, not national. [Third], African leaders have done very little to convince their people that nationhood offers more benefits than ethnicity".34 Fourth, African leaders have not defined the relationship between an ethnic group and state with respect to the common good. Fifth, African states have not managed to appropriate inherited cultural traditions to help come to terms with the cultural realities of the times and emerge with new visions for the future. Sixth, the approach to nation-building has not tried to find a way of integrating and welding together several ethnic groups into a large cohesive political community called the nation-state to help eliminate internal confusion and transfer ethnic loyalties to new central governments. Seventh, "there have been no efforts made to formulate viable and contextualized ideologies for contemporary African nations. [Eighth], there have been no effective ways of dealing with traditional moral standards that seem to crumble in the wake of rapid social change".35 Ninth, most governments do not respect the freedom of the judiciary and the rule of law.36 Tenth, the issue of political morality, as argued by Kwame Gyekye, has not been fully addressed. Conclusion In this essay we saw that ethnicity can become a blessing as long as it enriches social life. On the contrary, it can become a curse when it becomes the source of division and hatred between ethnic groups. In search for a balanced way to deal with ethnicity we can say that what Africa needs is not to get rid of [ethnicity]; one cannot think such an effort would succeed; Africans, like all other peoples of the world, need to device ways and means for all . . .ethnic groups to live together harmoniously and in a complementary relationship to each other. 37 In view of encountering this situation we can search for a way to implement practical ways of creating cohesion in African societies. First, there is a need to develop educational and cultural programmes at the grassroots level through which ethnic and cultural diversities can be appreciated and integrated into national unity. Non-governmental organizations, including the Church, can play a significant role in developing these programmes. Secondly, interethnic cooperation and dialogue, as proposed by Waruta, can be promoted as a national ideology. Third, the challenge of modern Africa should be how to promote complementarity between ethnic groups, mutual tolerance, accommodation of diversity of opinion, respect to pluralism, and cherish the sense of the common good. Fourth, the Church and other Non-governmental organizations are called to propose new ways of integrating ethnic identity into the structure of State. With regard to the ethnic tensions and conflicts something urgent must be done. In some African countries the situation is so bad that certain forms of ethnic hostilities are more ferocious than the apartheid policies of John Vorster of the former South Africa, more inhuman than the European colonization of Africa, and more lethal than Adolf Hitler’s Nazi movement.
Notes: 1 I prefer the term "ethnicity" rather than "tribalism." The reason is that the term "tribalism," in its common journalistic setting, is and that each tribe still retains a fundamental hostility towards its neighboring tribes. 2 John Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy (Oxford: Heinemann Educational Publishers, 1969), 102. 3 Jean-François Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (London: Longman, 1993), 50. 4 J. Lonsdale, "States and Social Process in Africa: A Histographical Survey," African Studies Review 3/2 (June-September, 1981): 139. I am not saying that modern African societies are to be organized in the same way. My point, following the argument of Lonsdale, is that the operative force and validity of a particular model of social organization depends very much on the culture and historical background of a particular society. As such, the way structures of state have been introduced in Africa remain meaningless to most Africans. 5 Hutus and Tutsis are the major ethnic groups in Rwanda and Burundi. The 1994 civil war in Rwanda was based on the ethnic hatred between these two groups. 6 David Hollenbach, "Plural Loyalties and Moral Agency in Government," in John C. Haughey, ed., Personal Values in Public Policy (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 77. 7 Ibid. 8 Abner Cohen, The Politics of Elite Culture: Explorations in the Dramaturgy of Power in a Modern African Society (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1981), 220. 9 Ibid., 79. 10 See Henry Shue, Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), 144-52. 11 Stanley Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1974), 238. 12 Goran Hyden, No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective (London: Heinemann, 1983). 13 Ted T. Gurr, "People Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System," in International Studies Quarterly 38 (1994): 347-77, at 355. 14 For a somewhat similar thought, see Robert H. Bates, "Modernization, Ethnic Competition and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa," in Donald Rothchild and V. A. Olorunsola, eds., State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), 164-65. 15 Solofo Randrianja, "Nationalism, Ethnicity and Democracy," in Stephen Ellis, ed., Africa Now: People, Policies, and Institutions (London: James Currey and Heinemann, 1996), 31. 16 Ibid., 32. 17 William Tordoff, Government and Politics in Africa (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), 86. 18 Ibid., 89. 19 "Prospective Voters and Ethnic Mongers," Mwananchi (August 2, Nairobi, 1997): 3. 20 Ibid. 21 D. W. Waruta, "Tribalism as a Moral Problem in Contemporary Africa," in J. N. K. Mugambi and A. Nasimiyu-Wasike, eds., Moral and Ethical Issues in African Christianity (Nairobi: Initiatives Publishers, 1992), 127. 22 Waruta, "Tribalism as a Moral Problem in Contemporary Africa," 128. 23 Ibid. 24 Aylward Shorter, "The Curse of Ethnocetrism and the African Church," Tangaza Occasional Papers No. 8, Ethnicity: Blessing or Curse (Nairobi: St. Paul Publications, 1999), 28-29. 25 Waruta, "Tribalism as a Moral Problem in Contemporary Africa," 134. 26 David Hollenbach, S.J., "Report From Rwanda: An Interview With Augustine Karekezi," in America (December 7, 1996): 13 - 17, at 16. 27 David Lamb, The Africans (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), 9. 28 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), 185. 29 See, for example, the analysis of ethnic interactions in the city of Nairobi, Kenya by Anthony O’Connor, The African City (London: Hutchinson University Library for Africa, 1983), 99-120. 30 Rodrigo MejRia, S.J., "Our Mission Today in the Context of the Eastern Africa Province," in Bishop Ndingi Mwana’ a Nzeki et al., Our Mission 450 Years Later (Nairobi: St. Joseph The Worker Printing Press, 1991), 49-50. 31 Kwesi Prah, "The Crisis of Neo-Colonialism in Africa and the Contemporary Democratic Challenge," in Hizkias Assefa and George Wachira, eds., Peacemaking and Democratization in Africa: Theoretical Perspectives and Church Initiatives (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1996), 19. 32 Henry Okullu, Church and Politics in East Africa (Nairobi: Uzima Press Limited, 1987), 45-46. 33 Lamb, The Africans, 11. 34 Ibid. 35 Kwame Gyekye, Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), vii-xii. 36 This problem is exacerbated by the lack of modern national constitutions that can restore people’s confidence. The existing national constitutions are constantly manipulated by the regime in power and serve only interests of the elite group or certain ethnic groups. 37 Waruta, "Tribalism as a Moral Problem in Contemporary Africa," 130.
Ref.: Text from the author.
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